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And when they had been there many days, Festus declared Paul's
cause unto the King, saying, There is a certain man left in bonds
by Felix: About whom, when I was at Jerusalem, the chief priests
and the elders of the Jews informed me, desiring to have judgment against him. To whom I answered, It is not the manner of
the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer
for himself concerning the crime laid against him. Acts 25:14-16.
Sir Walter Raleigh: But it is strange to see how you press me still
with my Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him; it is not for
gaining of time or prolonging my life that I urge this; he is in the
house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this confession of his,
it shall convict me and ease you of further proof. Sir Walter Raleigh's Case (1603).'
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI, § 1.
On April 5, 1965, the Supreme Court held in Pointerv. Texas2 that the
sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against
him was a fundamental right made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment. 3 Following his incorporation of the right of confrontation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
Mr. Justice Black declared for the Court that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him. In apparently equating confrontation
with cross-examination, the Court stated an almost universally prevail* Associate Professor of Law, Assistant Dean, Duke University School of Law. B.S.
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2. 880 U.S. 400 (1965).
3. Id. at 403.
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lug view that the core value protected by the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment is the right of cross-examination.
On December 15, 1970, only five years after Pointer sweepingly
declared the right of confrontation to be a fundamental right "essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution, '4 four judges speaking for the
Court in Dutton v. Evans5 were in full retreat from the feared consequences of Pointers incorporation of the confrontation clause into the
fourteenth amendment. In fact, after Dutton v. Evans and the decision
in Californiav. Green6 which presaged it by six months, the meaning
of the confrontation clause is no longer clear. The view that the core
value protected by the confrontation clause is cross-examination-a
view assumed in every major Supreme Court decision from Mattox v.
United States7 in 1894 until California v. Green in 1970, and almost
uniformly accepted by all commentators--can no longer be considered
the law.
The problem that frightened the Court in Green, and finally split
it in Evans revolves around the Hearsay Rule with its progeny of exceptions. When the Court incorporated the confrontation clause into
the fourteenth amendment, did it in effect constitutionalize the Hearsay Rule? As with the right of confrontation, most authorities agree
that the core value protected by the Hearsay Rule is its requirement
that testimony be subject to cross-examination to be admissible. Since
both the right of confrontation and the Hearsay Rule are premised
on the same fundamental value, protection of the right of cross-examination, it is easy to see why most authorities have treated confrontation
and hearsay as being roughly coextensive. If the sixth amendment right
of confrontation makes cross-examination a fundamental right in criminal trials, as Pointerv. Texas holds, and if cross-examination is really
the core value protected by the Hearsay Rule, then has not the Hearsay
Rule in fact been given constitutional dimensions? The Pointer theory
inexorably leads to this conclusion, a result which is precisely what
the plurality in Evans, with Mr. Justice Harlan concurring, desired to
avoid at all costs.
4. Id. at 404. In light of the Court's action in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970),
discussed below, it is interesting to note that in Pointer Mr. Justice Black stated that the
Supreme Court and other courts had been "nearly unanimous" in the view that confrontation and cross-examination 'were essential to a fair trial. Id. at 405.
5. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
6. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
7. 156 U.S. 237 (1894).
8. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICX, EVIDENCE § 224, at 458 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
McComzck); 5 Wwmom, EVIDENCE § 1595, at 123 (Sd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMo E]. But see 75 YA.E L.J. 1434, 1487 (1966).
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If the theory of Pointerleads to a constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule, which inter alia prohibits the admission of out of court
statements thus giving the accused a right of confrontation at the time
of trial, the practical effect upon the states may be to prevent reform
of one of the areas of evidence law most in need of overhaul. In attempting to resolve this conflict, the Court now finds itself in disagreement. The four justices who formed the plurality opinion in Evans
have taken a narrow view of the sixth amendment guarantee, which
does not expressly require that the right of confrontation occur at
the time of trial, and have, accordingly, refused to constitutionalize
the Hearsay Rule. However, the four dissenters in Evans expressed a
willingness to risk the possibility that their opinion will be read as
requiring the constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule in its entirety,
in order to protect what they believe is included in the constitutional
right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Mr.
Justice Harlan alone has most clearly seen the theoretic versus pragmatic dilemma that now divides the Court and has made two attempts
to devise a theory of confrontation that would avoid the pragmatic
problems of the Pointertheory. Thus, there is confusion over the meaning of a constitutional right long thought to be relatively free of
ambiguity.
In order to put today's confrontation dilemma in context, the
historical relationship between hearsay and confrontation will be discussed with a review of both the decisional law on confrontation prior
to 1970 and the recent attempts to reform the Hearsay Rule. The
opinion of each justice in Dutton v. Evans and Californiav. Green will
be examined in detail. Finally, a critique of possible solutions to the
present confrontation dilemma will be attempted.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND:
THE HEARSAY-CONFRONTATION INTERPLAY
Any attempt to understand the confrontation clause requires some
familiarity with the evidentiary Hearsay Rule and its exceptions. Perhaps the most quoted definition of the Hearsay Rule is that of
Professor McCormick:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a
statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an
assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and
thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter.9
9. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 226, at 460.
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Most authorities look to the opportunity for cross-examination by the
opponent as the touchstone of the rule. Dean Wigmore did not attempt
a definition of hearsay but said that the opportunity for cross-examtion is the test for its existence. 10 He presented the best available
thumbnail statement of the Hearsay Rule and the theory justifying
its existence:
The theory of the Hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness,
which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may
be best brought to light and exposed by the test of Cross-examination .... It is ... sufficient to note that the Hearsay rule, as ac-

cepted in our law, signifies a rule rejecting assertions, offered
testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the
test of Cross-examination."
To the exclusionary Hearsay Rule is appended a multiplicity of
exceptions for categories of out-of-court statements thought to be generally reliable and necessary even though they fit the definition of
hearsay and have not been subjected to cross-examination.' 2 Therefore,
in order to understand the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions, an appreciation of the importance of cross-examination in an adversary system
of justice is essential.

A.

CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY: THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP

1. Origins of Hearsay and Confrontation
Although most
1500's, the rule
1500's witnesses
juries obtained

scholars trace the origins of the Hearsay Rule to the
was not solidified until the early 1700's.'3 In the early
were rarely called to testify before juries. Rather, most
information by conducting their own out-of-court in-

10. The fundamental test [of hearsay], shown by experience to be invaluable, is the
test of Cross-examination." 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1362, at 3.
11. Id. Dean Wigmore did go on to point out that in many instances the definition
of hearsay included not only the test of cross-examination but also the test of the "oath."
Wigmore stated that "it is clear beyond doubt that the oath ... is merely an incidental
feature customarily accompanying cross-examination, and that cross-examination is the
essential and real test required by the rule." Id. at 7.
12. Depending on who is counting and how narrowly the exceptions are defined,
it is generally conceded that there are over 20 exceptions to the basic rule prohibiting
the intioduction of hearsay statements into evidence. See, e.g., Revised Draft of Proposed
Rules of Evidence for FederalCourt and Magistrates, 91 S.Ct. 1, 105-31 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Rules], where 30 specific exceptions are recognized.
13, For a more complete -history of the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions see 5

WIGMORa, supra note 8, § 1364, at 9-27; McCoRMICr, supra note 8, § 223, at 455-56; and
E. MoRGAN, SomE PRoBL ms oF Pnoor 106-17 (1956).
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vestigations. The witness, as we know him, did not begin to appear
with any regularity until the early 1600's and, between the early 1500's
and late 1600's, hearsay statements were generally received into evidence. However, as juries increasingly depended upon witnesses' incourt testimony, it became apparent that extensive use of hearsay was
inappropriate. Apparently by the mid-1600's the notion became fixed
that even an extrajudicial statement under oath should not be used
if the declarant could be brought into court. 14 The crystallization of
the Hearsay Rule occurred by the early 1700's when it was recognized
that no statement should be received in evidence unless the persons
affected by it had an opportunity to probe its trustworthiness by crossexamination. Despite its purpose of preserving the right of cross-examination, it soon became obvious that the rule's enforcement was
impractical in routine litigation because of the difficulty of obtaining
first-hand statements to prove every disputed fact. In meeting the
challenge of constant compromise, the courts attempted to define sharp
categories of hearsay evidence that would be admitted, while excluding
other hearsay evidence not within an excepted category. 15 Underlying
almost every exception was the feeling of courts, at least at the time
the exception was first recognized, that a particular category of outof-court statements were generally reliable and necessary. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries so many exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule had been recognized that there was reaction against further
expansion of exceptions. The exceptions, just as the rule, became
inflexible. More situations arose where reliable and necessary hearsay
was excluded from evidence because of failure to fall into a recognized
exception. Therefore, the Hearsay Rule with its hard-shell exceptions
came under attack by reformers and major efforts have been made
toward its modernization.
The history of the right of confrontation, as constitutionalized by
the sixth amendment, closely parallels the early history of the establishment of the Hearsay Rule. While some authorities trace the right to
14. Wigmore asserts that: "By 1680-1690 . . . had come the establishment of the
general rule against unsworn hearsay statements." 5 Wiwvo, supra note 8, § 1564, at 25.
In any event, most historians agree that by the early 1700's the applicability of the
Hearsay Rule to sworn statements as well as unsworn statements had been established.
15. Most exceptions, as indicated by McCormick, "were struck off in the heat of
trial as improvisations intended to be played by ear, but they fail of that purpose because
the classes are grown so many and the boundaries so meandering that no one can carry
any large part of this hearsay-exception-learning in his head." McComRMC, supra note 8,
§ 301, at 626.
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Roman times,16 most trace its growth to a reaction to the abuses that
appeared in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. An accused's right to cross-

examine adverse witnesses was established in the American colonies
by the beginning of the early eighteenth century.'7 The exact intent of
the framers of the Constitution in providing that the accused shall
"have the right to confront the witnesses against him" is probably undiscoverable.' 8 Nevertheless, most courts and scholars have assumed
that the essential concept of confrontation is a face-to-face encounter
between the accused and his accusers where the accused has the right to
question his accusers and the trier of fact has the right to place the
accusers under oath and observe their demeanor under questioning.
Thus, the fundamental value to be preserved by the right of confrontation is cross-examination, the same value that, according to Wigmore,
is the test for determining whether an item of evidence is hearsay.
Therefore, it appears that the Hearsay Rule and the right of confrontation which developed in the same era were both designed to protect
the same value: cross-examination. 9
2.

The Wigmore Theory

The idea that hearsay and confrontation are coextensive-two rules to
protect the value of cross-examination-was most clearly articulated by
Wigmore and has been concurred in by most commentators. 20 It is
16.

Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History in Modern Dress, 8 J. Pun. L.

84 (1959).
17. Id. at 395. Pollitt asserted that the American colonies probably deemed it necessary to give the right of confrontation constitutional status because of the method of
administration of English navigation law. He stated that following the French and Indian
War, enforcement of custom laws designed to force the colonists to bear part of the costs
of the war, was achieved by promising informers a "moiety of forfeitures." The informer
naturally desired to have his name remain unknown. Under the Navigation Act or Custom
Laws, many offending ships and their illegal cargo were seized. Unless the ship owner
was able to combat the allegations of unknown informers, his cargo was sold and the
proceeds were divided, one-half to the crown and the other half to the informers. Id. at
395-96.

18. For references to discussions of the possible intent of the framers of the Constitution see, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 95 (concurring opinion); California v. Green,
299 U.S. at 175-79, especially 176 n.8 (concurring opinion); Pollitt, supra note 16, at
397-400 n.16; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1397, at 127-35; 5 SUPFOLK U.L. Rn. 538, 542
(1971).

19. For a more complete treatment of the historical interrelationship between the
two rules, see Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. RaV. 741, 747 (1965), which states: "Both the

right to confrontation and the Hearsay Rule reflect the belief that some evidence which
might be of probative value should not be admitted unless the declarant has actually
appeared in court and has been cross-examined with regard to his sincerity, memory,
perception, and ability to communicate."
20.

See, e.g., F. HELtm, THE SrxATAMENDmENT 104-06 (1951), which, in a history of the
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essential to follow Wigmore's logic that hearsay and confrontation are
basically the same rule (both having the object of preserving the test of
cross-examination) because his theories of hearsay and confrontation
are now imbedded in decisional law. His theories pose the "spectre" 21
of constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule.
Step One: Wigmore's first premise is that the fundamental test to
be employed in determining hearsay is cross-examination. 22 He indicates that the Hearsay Rule actually has two elements which he refers
to as "cross-examination proper" and "confrontation." Confrontation
means the preliminary process of bringing the witness face-to-face with
the accused prior to the time the accused commences cross-examination
(he refers to confrontation as securing "the opportunity" for crossexamination). 23 Cross-examination, however, is the essential object of
confrontation and is the one indispensable element of the Hearsay Rule.
Step Two: The second premise is that the fundamental test of the
right of confrontation is whether there was a right of cross-examination.
Wigmore states: "If there has been a Cross-examination, there has been
a Confrontation. The satisfaction of the right of Cross-examination disposes of any objection based on the so-called right of Confrontation. '24
Confrontation and cross-examination are the same right under different
names.25
sixth amendment, disposes of the right of confrontation in two and one-half pages and
asserts that the confrontation guarantee is violated by introduction of evidence given by
witnesses whom the accused has not had the opportunity to cross-examine; McCoRMrCK,
supra note 8, § 231, at 484, where the author contends that the probable purpose of the
confrontation clause was to guarantee maintenance of the "hard-won principle of the
hearsay rule" in criminal cases; and, Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L.
Rxv. 63, 236 (1968), where there was acceptance of the notion that hearsay and confrontation have been thought to be generally co-extensive. But see Note, Confrontation, Cross
Examination, and the Right to Preparea Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939, 953 (1968), where it
is argued that because courts often refer to both confrontation and cross-examination,
contrary to Wigmore's theory, they must not be the same thing; 1970 UTAH L. REv. 668,
669-70.
21. This term is employed in Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent in Dutton v. Evans, 400
US. at 110.
22. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1361, at 3.
23. Id. § 1365, at 27. He also contends that confrontation, in addition to affording
the accused "the right to the opportunity of cross-examination," also provides an incidental and subordinate advantage of allowing the tribunal to observe the demeanor of
the witness. However, Wigmore contends that this secondary "demeanor" aspect of confrontation may be "dispensed with when ... not feasible." Id.
24. Id. § 1396, at 127.
25. There never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable
thing called Confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination. There was a
right to cross-examination as indispensable, and that right was involved in and
secured by confrontation; it was the same right under different names. This
much is clear enough from the history of the Hearsay rule ... . and from the
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Step Three: If cross-examination is the fundamental test of the
Hearsay Rule (Step One), and if the right to cross-examination is the
fundamental test of the right of confrontation (Step Two), then Step
Three in Wigmore's logic is dear. He asserts: "The rule sanctioned by
the Constitution [referring to the sixth amendment right of an accused
to confront the witnesses against him] is the Hearsay Rule as to crossexamination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found,
'26
developed, or created therein.
This short synopsis of Wigmore's hearsay and confrontation theories indicates why courts have consistently treated both rules as dealing
with the right of cross-examination. It is also clear why, after Pointerv.
Texa 27 applied the confrontation clause to the states, the Supreme
Court at some point had to face the issue of the constitutionalization of
the Hearsay Rule.
B.

CONFRONTATION:

THE

DECISIONAL LAW

Prior to Pointer,when the sixth amendment confrontation clause was
only a federal standard, the Wigmore idea that the right to confront
witnesses was a restatement of a right not to have hearsay evidence
introduced in criminal trials appeared harmless enough. There was no
prevailing fear of constitutionalizing the Hearsay Rule to retard the
28
natural development of the meaning of the confrontation clause. Of
continuous understanding and exposition of the idea of confrontation .... It
follows that, if the accused has had the benefit of cross-examination, he has had
the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution.
5 WiouoRE, supra note 8, § 1397, at 128-30.
26. Id. § 1397, at 131. In reading hearsay and confrontation as the same constitutional

rule, Wigmore concluded with a most important paragraph used by Justice Harlan to
justify his second theory of confrontation in his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970). Id. at 178 et seq.
The net result, then, under the constitutional rule is that, so far as testimony
is required under the Hearsay rule to be taken infra-judicially, it shall be taken

in a certain way, namely, subject to cross-examination,-not secretly or, 'ex parte'
away from the accused. The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially,-this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being,-but only what mode of
procedure shall be followed-i.e., a cross-examining procedure-in the case of
such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of Evidence to be given infrajudicially.
Id. § 1397, at 131.

27.

380 US. 400 (1965).

28. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 179-80 n.14,
states, "It is not surprising that confrontation and hearsay have been considered fungible.
The labels were not until recently likely to affect the result in federal trial." But see
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953), which warns prior to Pointer that: "The
hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties, anomalies and ramifications, [should] not be
read into the Fourteenth Amendment." Wigmore did perceive the problem of constitu-
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the surprisingly few cases prior to 1965 where the Supreme Court was
required to deal with the meaning of the right of confrontation, the
first major case was Mattox v. United States. 29 In a famous passage in
that case, Mr. Justice Brown stated that the primary objective of the
confrontation guarantee is the prevention of:
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.3 0
As in Mattox, most of the early cases involved ex parte testimony submitted by deposition and affidavit.31 Other fact situations which raised
confrontation problems involved the use of confessions, 32 the exclusion
tionalization and as a result, after concluding that hearsay and confrontation "are the
same rule under different" names, he drafted the paragraph, cited in note 25 supra, that
was used by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans.
29. 156 US. 237 (1895). The defendant was retried for the same murder three times.
In the last trial two of the government's witnesses had died, and the government introduced stenographic notes of their testimony. The Court allowed the use of the trial
transcript because the witnesses had been fully cross-examined at the previous trial.
30. Id. at 242-43.
31. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 US. 145 (1879), where the Court held that an
accused cannot complain about the introduction of prior recorded testimony when the
defendant himself procured the witness's absence at the later trial; Motes v. United States,
178 U.S. 458 (1900), where a witness's statement taken at an examining trial and subject
to cross-examination could not be introduced at the trial when it appeared that the
Government could have produced the witness at trial; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258
(1904), rev'd, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), where deposition testimony was
admitted into evidence at a state trial, deponent was a non-resident, and the Court held
that the sixth amendment did not apply to the states. Cf. Kirby v. United States, 174 US.
47 (1899), which did not involve the use of deposition testimony, but did involve introduction of a prior judgment of conviction against three thieves to prove that property in
Kirby's possession was stolen. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
at 98, states that Kirby is not a confrontation case at all but a case dealing with the
substantive law of judgments.
32. Stein v. New York, 346 US. 156, 195 (1953), rev'd, Jackson v. Denno, 378 US.
368 (1964), involved the use of written confessions of two codefendants against the accused
when the latter had himself never confessed. The court held defendant's federal rights were
not infringed merely "because he was unable to cross-examine accusing witnesses." The
court rejected, citing West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), the contention that a "privilege of confrontation" is secured by the fourteenth amendment. Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), decided the same day as Pointer, involved separate trials for one
Loyd and defendant Douglas who were both accused of the same murder. Loyd was tried
first and his case was on appeal when he was called to testify at Douglas' trial- Loyd
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of the accused from his own trial,33 close association between key witnesses and the jury,34 the absence of an accused in appellate courts
where he was represented by counsel,3 5 the use of prior inconsistent
statements in administrative proceedings,3 6 and lack of cross-examination in administrative hearings.8 7 It is safe to conclude, after an examination of the cases up to and including Pointer in 1965,38 that confrontation in federal trials meant that a criminal defendant had to be
granted the opportunity to face and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. 9 The close relationship between hearsay and confrontation is
further indicated by the recognition that exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule did not violate the confrontation clause if they appeared to pro40
vide adequate protection to the defendant.
After Pointer, the possibility of constitutionalization of the Hearrefused to answer questions at Douglas' trial, and the prosecutor, under the guise of impeaching Douglas, purported to read from Loyd's confession which implicated Douglas.
The Supreme Court held that Douglas' sixth amendment rights were violated.
33. In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), a secret one-man grand jury took testimony
from petitioner, and then, based on other testimony taken out of his presence, determined
his answers had been false, and therefore he was held in contempt and sentenced. Although In re Oliver was treated as a due process case, it was pointed out that, among
other things, the accused's right to cross-examine the witnesses against him had been
denied.
34. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) held that where two deputy sheriffs
had close contact with the jurors over whom they had custody at the same trial where
the deputies were the principal prosecution witnesses, the defendant's right to trial by an
impartial jury and his right to confront the witnesses against him were denied.
35. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911) held that certification by the judge
and clerk of the trial record to an appellate court, without the accused being present, did
not violate the confrontation clause.
86. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) reversed a deportation order on the ground
that use of such statements violated agency rules and ran counter to notions of fair play;
the right of confrontation was not specifically mentioned.
37. See Greene v. McElroy, 860 U.S. 474 (1959), where an accused was denied a
security clearance in an administrative hearing where he was not allowed to confront or
cross-examine the witnesses against him; the Court held that the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination should have been afforded.
88. In Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965), the chief witness testified at a preliminary
hearing where neither of the two suspects had a lawyer; one suspect tried to cross-examine but Pointer did not. Pointer was tried, and at trial the state offered the transcript of
the chief witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing. The chief witness had moved out
of state, and the prosecution made no attempt to procure his return. The Supreme Court
reversed his conviction and overruled West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), to hold the
sixth amendment confrontation clause was a fundamental right that applied to the states.
59. See Note, supra note 19, at 745; and Note, supra note 20, at 960. Justice Harlan,
arguing in his concurring opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 179 n.14, concedes
that early decisions and recent cases are replete with dicta to the effect that confrontation
is equivalent to cross-examination.
40. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 287 (1895); and Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899), for approval of the dying declaration exception to the Hearsay Rule.
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say Rule was present. However, that fear apparently did not occur to
the Court until the 1970 confrontation cases discussed herein. The case
law between 1965 and 1970, other than applying confrontation guarantees to the states as well as to the federal government, seemed to develop
along its earlier lines with the Wigmore theory-confrontation
"equals" cross-examination "equals" hearsay--continuing in full
bloom.

41

C.

HEARSAY: THE REFORM EFFORTS

The rigidity of the common-law Hearsay Rule and its frequently arbitrary exceptions have long challenged the talents of legal reformers.
Jeremy Bentham proposed a major revision of the Hearsay Rule that,
although not adopted, indicates the long history of reform efforts. 42 At
the urging of James Bradley Thayer, Massachusetts adopted the first
major American reform of the Hearsay Rule with its Hearsay Statute
of

1898. 4 3
41.

While there have been several innovations in local hearsay

Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) held that alleged "waiver" of right to con-

front witnesses was not valid where his counsel agreed to a "prima facie" trial in lieu of
actual cross-examination of witnesses; Parker v. Gladden, 885 U.S. 868 (1966) held that a
bailiff's statements to the jury out of the presence of the accused were subject to confrontation objections; Barber v. Page, 890 U.S. 719 (1968) held that where the state was negligent
in not procuring at trial the presence of a codefendant who had testified at a preliminary
hearing, he was not "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation clause; Smith v.
Illinois, 890 U.S. 129 (1968) held that where credibility was in issue, the refusal to allow
cross-examination as to an informer's name violated the confrontation clause; Bruton v.
United States, 891 U.S. 128 (1968) held that an instruction to the jury to disregard an
out-of-court confession of a codefendant was not sufficient to satisfy the right of confrontation; Roberts v. Russell, 892 U.S. 293 (1968) held that in a state trial where an
out-of-court confession of a codefendant was admitted, Bruton was to be applied retroactively; Berger v. California, 898 U.S. 814 (1969) held that where the victim was out of
state at the time of trial, the accused was denied his right of confrontation under Barber v.
Page which was to be applied retroactively; Harrington v. California, 895 U.S. 250 (1969)
held that even though the out-of-court confessions of codefendants were admitted, under
the facts there was no reversible error. See also Illinois v. Allen, 897 US. 37 (1970), for a
new development in confrontation law dealing with an accused who by his disruptive
conduct waived his right to be present at his own trial.
42. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)
(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HLv. L. REv. 932 (1962).
43. "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as
hearsay if the Court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of
the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." MAss. Aars. 1898, ch. 535.
This famous statute has since been amended by striking out the requirement that the
declaration must have been made before the commencement of the action and in other
minor ways. MAss. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) ch. 232, § 65, as amended 1941 and 1943. McCormick
comments that judicial interpretation of the Massachusetts statute has been generally
consistent with the purpose of opening the door to the trusworthy statements and asserts
that the act has the support of Massachusetts practitioners. McColaxcK, supra note 8,
§ 803, at 680.
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rules," the next major legislative effort was the English Evidence Act
of 1938 promoted by Lord Maughan, the Lord Chancellor. Recent

American reform efforts in the hearsay area can be found in new model
codes attempting a codification of the entire body of evidentiary law.
1. The Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and the McCormick Exception

The American Law Institute (ALI) made the first effort to restructure
the entire law of evidence. Out of its pioneering efforts came the famous
1942 draft of the Model Code of Evidence. After discarding the notion
that evidence was an area of law that could be restated, the ALI completely revised the entire field.45 The drafters of the Model Code were
talented, 4 6 but lawyers found its radical departures from traditional
views "too far-reaching and drastic for present day acceptance." 47 The
Model Code drafters proposed a broad new hearsay exception that
seemed capable of almost swallowing the rule. 48 The Model Code has
not been adopted in any jurisdiction.
In 1949, the ALI referred its Model Code to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for redrafting in the
hope that it might yet serve as a basis for a uniform code of evidence
for all jurisdictions. Out of this referral came the more positively received Uniform Rules of Evidence. 49 The Uniform Rules were formally
44. See J. MAGUIRE, J. WENSTEu, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSELD, EvIDENcE 540 (1965)
for an excellent summary of efforts to relax the Hearsay Rule.
45. "The Council of the Institute . .. felt that a Restatement of the Law of Evidence would be a waste of time or worse; that what was needed was a thorough revision
of existing law. A bad rule of law is not cured by clarification." INTRODucTIoN To MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE viii (1942).

46. A "blue ribbon" group consisting of seven law professors and four appellate
judges. Id. at ix.
47. Prefatory Note to Uniform Rules of Evidence. See Symposium on the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: Part I 15 WAYNE L. Rzv. 1061, 1063-64 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Symposium], for another summary of major reform efforts.
48. "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as witness, or (b) is present and subject to cross-examination."
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 at 231 (1942) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]. This
rule was qualified by other rules which limited its application to declarations by those
with personal knowledge (excluding hearsay upon hearsay) and empowered the trial
judge with discretion to exclude such hearsay when its probative value was outweighed by
other considerations such as prejudice or unfair surprise. In addition to this new sweeping exception, the traditional exceptions were retained and liberalized. See Braham, The
Uniform Rules of Evidence, The Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia), April 27, 1955, § 1,
at 1, col. 1, for a contemporary reaction to the Model Code's hearsay exception.
49. There was widespread approval from bench, bar and academic community. Symposium, supra note 47, at 1064. See the commissioner's note following Rule 63 of the
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approved by both the ALI and the American Bar Association in 1953,
but legislative response was tepid. They were adopted only in the
Panama Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, and, with some revision, in
Kansas. Nevertheless, they did have considerable impact on decisional
law and have been frequently quoted as the best of the common-law
rules.r0
Perhaps the most sweeping reform proposal was Professor McCormick's suggested exception: "[A] hearsay statement will be received
if the judge finds that the need for and the probative value of the
statement render it a fair means of proof under the circumstances." 5' 1
On the theory that most exceptions are at least theoretically underpinned by necessity and trustworthiness, Professor McCormick has
made the ultimate proposal: to admit all probative statements that the
trial judge finds are necessary.
2. The New State Codes
The two most important state statutory revisions have occurred in
California and New Jersey. The California Law Revision Commission
began a massive study in 1956 which compared the Uniform Rules with
the existing California evidence law. A draft of an entirely new state
evidence code, modeled on the Uniform Rules as modified by state
tradition and local policies, was submitted in 196452 and enacted in
1965. Hearsay is defined traditionally as "[e]vidence of a statement...
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing... that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."5 3 Perhaps the most
significant new exception to the Hearsay Rule, which provides that a
prior inconsistent statement of a trial witness is admissible as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated,5 4 is discussed in
the 1970 confrontation case, Californiav. Green.
New Jersey's Evidence Act of 1960 adopted the Uniform Rules in
part but was heavily modified to conform to New Jersey public policy.
Also in 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a new evidence
UNirFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE for a candid statement of the commissioner's reasons for

rejecting Rule 503 (a) of the MODES. CODE, supra note 48, and their return to the more
traditional concept of hearsay.

50. Symposium, supra note 47, at 1065.
51. McCoRMIcK, supra note 8, § 305, at 634.
52. See 7 CALrFoRNiA LAW REViSION COMmiSsION, REPoRTS RECOmwmNDATIONS, AND
STuDIEs 3, 1007-08 (1965).
53. CAL. EVIm. CODE § 1200 (West 1966).
54. See McDonough, The California Evidence Code: A Precis, 18 HAST. L.J. 89, 111
(1966).
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revision committee. The new commission reported in 1963, generally
following the Uniform Rules but including local suggestions. After
further modification, the new rules became law in 1967. 55
The right of confrontation and its implication of possible constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule in criminal trials has been carefully
sidestepped by reformers as they grappled with revisions of traditional
hearsay law.50
3. The Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates
It now appears obvious that the Uniform Rules have no chance of
being adopted in all states. The California and New Jersey experience
indicates that each state will blend its own public policy into any rules
adopted. Therefore, those desiring some form of uniform evidentiary
rules look to the experience of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the answer. In 1941, Professor Thomas Green of Harvard suggested
that the Supreme Court promulgate rules of evidence for all federal
courts under the same power utilized to adopt the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 57 In March, 1971, a Revised Draft of Proposed Rules
55. NJ. STAT. ANN. 2A: 84A (West Supp. 1970). New Jersey's definition of hearsay is
similar to that found in the new California code. Id. at 2A: 84A, Rule 63.
56. Rule 63(4)(c) of the UNIFORM Ru-S included a broad definition of "unavailability" for use in applying hearsay exceptions. The New Jersey Committee did propose to
limit the broad sweep of 63(4)(c) to civil cases possibly because of worries about the right
of confrontation. See REPORT OF THE NEw JERSEY SUPREME CouRT CoMMrrrEE ON EVIDENCE
146-53 (1963). Furthermore, CAL. Evm. CODE § 1204 states:
A statement that is otherwise admissible as hearsay evidence is inadmissible
against the defendant in a criminal action if the statement was made, either by
the defendant or by another, under such circumstances that it is inadmissible
against the defendant under the Constitution of the United States or the State
of California.
Provisions dealing with the prior testimony exception under the new state codes follow
the same rationale as discussed in note 60 infra, dealing with the Revised Draft's treatment
of prior testimony. CAL. EvD. CODE § 1290-92 (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 84A, Rule
63(3) (West Supp. 1970). Unlike the Uniform Rules, New Jersey and California provide
that former testimony is not admissible if confrontation is denied or if the accused was
not a party in the prior hearing. This limitation arises from a caveat in the CoMmNT To
UNIFORm RuLE 63(3) that the use of former testimony against an accused may violate his
right of confrontation. See Proposed Rules, supra note 12, at 128. "Professor Faulkner
concluded that if a dying declaration untested by cross-examination is constitutionally
admissible, former testimony tested by cross-examination of one similarly situated does
not offend against confrontation." Id. at 127. Although these codes discuss hearsay and
confrontation, they all seem to steer a clear course away from equating the two. CAL.
Evw. CODE § 1291 Comment speaks of the lack of cross-examination as the primary objection to hearsay. These codes stress cross-examination in terms of hearsay but never
really define confrontation.
57. Symposium, supra note 47, at 1066-69. Sixteen years after Professor Green's suggestion, the Judicial Conferences of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Cir-
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of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 58 was issued
which reexamined hearsay and advanced some new approaches.5 9 However, the Advisory Committee for the Proposed Rules of Evidence dealt
only obliquely with the interplay between confrontation and the Hearsay Rule.60
D.

CONFRONTATION:

THm

SEVERAL COMPONENTS OF THE RIGHT

The above review of the historical interaction between confrontation
and hearsay indicates that the two rules are based on similar values. 6'
cuits recommended that uniform rules of evidence for federal courts be drafted, and in
1961 Chief Justice Warren appointed a special committee on evidence.
58. Proposed Rules, supra note 12.
59. The new Revised Draft's approach to hearsay was to adopt a general rule excluding hearsay (utilizing an interesting new definition of hearsay that removes nonassertive conduct and admissions of a party-opponent from the confines of the exclusionary Hearsay Rule) and then to group the traditional exceptions, which are somewhat liberalized, under two general headings. One heading deals with situations where
the out-of-court declarant is not available and the other deals with situations where
out-of-court statements will be admitted, regardless of whether the declarant is available
or not. After listing the specific exceptions under the two general headings, both headings
conclude with an "escape valve" exception providing for admissibility of "a statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Proposed Rule 808(24) and Rule 804(6).
60. The first reference was in connection with Proposed Rule 808 exception (5). It
stated that the hearsay exception for recorded recollection is generally recognized and
has "long been favored by the federal and practically all of the state courts that have had
occasion to decide the question:' Id. at 111; United States v. Kelly, 849 F.2d 720, 770 (2d
Cir. 1965), was cited as sustaining the exception against a claimed denial of the right of
confrontation.
The second mention of confrontation was in conjunction with Proposed Rule 804(b)
exception (1) dealing with the former testimony exception. This exception is often
present in confrontation cases as it was in California v. Green, cited id. at 127. The committee talked in terms of absence of demeanor evidence since oath and cross-examination
had been satisfied in the former proceeding. Because of lack of demeanor evidence, this is
an allowable exception only where the declarant is unavailable.
61. Both the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule reflect the belief that ..
some evidence which might be of probative value should not be admitted unless
the declarant has actually appeared in court and has been cross-examined with
regard to his sincerity, memory, perception, and ability to communicate. When
courts have admitted hearsay in criminal trials, they have generally attempted
only to fit the evidence within one of the established common-law hearsay exceptions which have developed because of a certain notion of potential trustworthiness, or because of necessity. However, the purpose of the common-law exceptions
appears to be to facilitate the admission of probative evidence. These exceptions
have evolved from a weighing of the need to receive the evidence at trial, the unavailability of the declarant, the assumed trustworthiness of the statement, and the
risk that the jury will not properly assess the weight to be given to the statement.
But in a criminal trial, these considerations must be balanced in light of the
requirement of the sixth amendment, which has as its prime goal the protection
at trial of an accused faced with the possibility of criminal sanctions.
Note, supra note 19, at 747. See also Note, supra note 20, at 958, which suggests that confrontation beyond cross-examination has an additional meaning which encompasses
demeanor.
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Nevertheless, prior to commencing a detailed study of the 1970 confrontation cases, it is important tounderstand the recognized components of
confrontation prior to 1970:62 cross-examination, demeanor, and oath.
While cross-examination was generally recognized as the most important component of the confrontation clause,63 Wigmore treated demeanor as a second, and dispensable, element. Most authorities agree
that the right of an accused to have the trier of fact observe the demeanor of the witness during testimony is less significant than cross-examination, but still an important part of the right of confrontation.6 4 In
Mattox v. United States,65 the Court stated that confrontation meant
not only cross-examination but also "compelling him [the witness] to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Nevertheless, following Wigmore's notion of the secondary nature of the demeanor
component, most courts will not protect demeanor functions absolutely.66 Finally, although many older authorities treated the element
62. "It seems probable that the purpose of the American provisions for confrontation was to guarantee the maintenance in criminal cases of the hard-won principle of
the hearsay rule .... " McCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 231, at 484. McCormick contends that
production of prosecutor's witnesses at the final trial is important because it provides:
(1) opportunity for cross-examination; (2) enables accused to look the witness in the eye
making false accusation more difficult; and (3) judge and jury will see demeanor of witnesses on the stand and better be able to judge credibility. Id.
63. Since Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1894), the right of cross-examination
has been the main focus of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325 (1911); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400
(1965); and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
64. In his treatise on evidence, Wigmore has a brief section on demeanor. He states
in 5 WiOMoRs, supra note 8, § 1395, at 125-26:
There is, however, a secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness; the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive
and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a
certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness.
Wigmore then cited APPLETON, EVIDENCE 220 (1860) as follows:
The witness present, the promptness and unpremeditatedness of his answers or
the reverse, their distinctness and particularity or the want of these essentials,
their incorrectness in generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness, are
soon detected . . . . The appearance and manner, the voice, the gestures, the
readiness and promptness of the answers, the evasions, the reluctance, the silence,
the contumacious silence, the contradictions, the explanations, the intelligence or
the want of intelligence of the witness, the passions which move or control-fear,
love, hate, envy, or revenge-are all open to observation, noted and weighed by

the jury.
5 WIGmoE, supra note 8, § 1395, at 126.

65.

156 U.S. 237 (1894).

66. But, when California v. Green was at the California Supreme Court level, that
court justified its holding by relying on the demeanor component of confrontation: "lilt
is because demeanor-attitude and mariner-is a significant factor in weighing testimonial evidence that it is axiomatic the trier of fact, before whom the witness testified,
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of the oath as an important part of confrontation, it is not as important
today and is usually treated as a subpart of the right of cross-examination.67
II.

THE 1970 CONFRONTATION CASES

In 1970, the assumptions about the meaning of the confrontation
clause of the sixth amendment were upset by two Supreme Court
decisions: Californiav, Green65 and Dutton v. Evans.6 9
A. CALIFoRNA v. GREEN
John Anthony Green was convicted of furnishing marijuana to
16 year old Melvin Porter. Green's conviction was supported chiefly by
the testimony and prior inconsistent statements of young Porter, who,
in January, 1967, had been arrested for selling marijuana to a Los
Angeles Police Department undercover officer. While in custody four
days after his arrest, Porter told an interrogating officer, Barry Wade,
that Green had been his drug supplier. He claimed that Green, a 24
year old acquaintance, had called him at his home earlier that month
and was cross-examined, is the sole judge of the credibility of a witness and of the weight
to be given his testimony."
67. Wigmore pointed out that while the testing required by the Hearsay Rule is

spoken of as "cross-examination under oath":
[I]t is clear beyond doubt that the oath, as thus referred to, is merely an incidental feature customarily accompanying cross-examination, and that crossexamination is the essential and real test required by the rule.
That this is so is seen by the perfectly well-established rule that a statement
made under oath (for example, in the shape of a deposition or an affidavit or
testimony before a magistrate) is nevertheless inadmissible if it has not been
subjected to cross-examination ....
In other words, a statement made under oath
is, merely as such, equally obnoxious to the Hearsay rule. [In footnote Wigmore
quotes, Vann, J. in Lent v. Shear, 160 N.Y. 462, 55 N.E. 2 (1899), "Declarations
made under oath do not differ in principle from declarations made without
that sanction, and both come within the rule which excludes all hearsay evidence."] Owing to the practice of requiring an oath (or its modern substitute, an
affirmation) before proceeding to examination and cross-examination, the case
does not happen to arise of testimony which has been tested by cross-examination
and yet lacks the oath, so that the tenor of the rule as above stated cannot be
tested by that situation. :But it is sufficiently and clearly demonstrated . . . by
the fact that, even though an oath has been taken, the statements are still excluded if not subjected to cross-examination: as well as by the further fact that,
whenever an exception to the Hearsay rule ... is found established, i.e.: whenever
statements not subjected to cross-examination are exceptionally received, it is not
required that they shall have been made under oath.
It is thus apparent that the essence of the Hearsay rule is a requirement that
testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination, and that
the judicial expressions . . . coupling oath and cross-examination had in mind
the oath as merely the ordinary accompaniment of testimony given on the stand,
subject to the essential test of cross-examination.
5 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1262, at 7.
68. 899 US. 149 (1970).
69. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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and had requested that he sell some "grass." Porter further recounted
to Officer Wade that on that same afternoon Green had personally

delivered to him a brown shopping bag containing 29 "baggies" of
marijuana, telling him he could keep one bag for himself but must sell

the rest. Based primarily on this information, 70 Green was arrested and
charged with furnishing marijuana to a minor.7 1
At Green's preliminary hearing, Porter claimed Green was his
supplier; however, he alleged at that hearing that instead of personally
delivering the "baggies," Green had indicated to him where he could
find the marijuana which had been hidden in the bushes at Green's
parents' home. Porter's testimony at the preliminary hearing was subject to what the majority opinion of Mr. Justice White describes as
"extensive cross-examination." 72 At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, probable cause was found based on Porter's testimony and
Green was bound over for the trial which occurred two months later.
Green was tried before a court sitting without a jury with Porter
as the chief witness for the State."8 However, to use the California
Supreme Court's words, this time Porter was "markedly evasive and
uncooperative on the stand."7' 4 He did state, however, that Green had
called him and asked him for some "stuff"; he also stated that he had
obtained 29 "baggies" of marijuana-some of which he sold, the rest
being "stolen" from him. But after those admissions, Porter's testimony
became somewhat less helpful to the prosecutor. Despite being pressed
to identify Green as his supplier, Porter claimed he was uncertain
about how he had obtained the drugs. He said he could not remember
because he had taken "acid" (LSD) 20 minutes prior to Green's phone
call and could not distinguish fact from fantasy.
70. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 657, 451 P.2d 422, 423, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784
(1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). There was further corroborating information from an
Officer Dominguez, another undercover agent, who had had a recent encounter with
Green involving drugs.
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CoDE § 11532 (West 1964).
72. 399 U.S. at 151. Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion states that defense
counsel for Green "did not engage in a searching examination." Id. at 191. Mr. Justice
Brennan points out that neither the defense nor the prosecution asked chief witness Porter
whether he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the alleged offense.
73. Porter was then out on probation after pleading guilty to his offense. For
detailed summary of the facts, see 32 OHIo STATE L.J. 188, 189 (1971).
74. 70 Cal. 2d at 657, 451 P.2d at 423, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 783. Quoted, 399 U.S. at 151.
It should be noted that both the presiding judge and the prosecutor commented on the
general unreliability and worthlessness of Porter's testimony at trial. The defendant
called two character witnesses at the trial who testified to Porter's poor reputation in
the community. Brief for Respondent at 3, 4 n.2, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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At various points in his direct examination of Porter, the prosecutor, in order to combat the witness's evasiveness, read portions of
Porter's earlier preliminary hearing testimony. Particularly damaging
to Green was that part of the preliminary hearing testimony wherein
Porter had said that Green specifically asked him to sell marijuana and
that he had obtained the marijuana from the yard of Green's parents'
home at Green's instructions. This preliminary hearing testimony was
used at the trial to "refresh" Porter's recollection and was admitted
into evidence as a prior inconsistent statement. However, contrary to
'the usual restrictive use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes only, under the new California Evidence Code 75 Porter's
prior inconsistent statements made at the preliminary hearing were
admitted as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter
contained in the statements. After the prosecutor's reading of the preliminary hearing transcript, Porter's memory was sufficiently "refreshed" for him to testify that his preliminary hearing statements were
the truth as he then believed it to be and that he "guessed" he had
obtained the drug from Green's parents' yard and had given the money
from its sale to Green. On cross-examination by Green's defense counsel, Porter indicated that the preliminary hearing transcript had merely
"refreshed" his memory as to what he had said at the preliminary hearing and that he had no independent recollection of the actual episode.
Later in the trial, Officer Wade testified for the prosecution that four
days after his arrest, Porter had told him that Green had personally
delivered the marijuana to Porter's house. Wade's testimony was also
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement of Porter to be used as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter contained in the statement
75. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235, § 770 (West 1966). "Section 1235 Inconsistent statement.
Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the Hearsay
Rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered
in compliance with § 770. (Stats. 1965, c.299, § 1235)." The Comment of the Law Revision
Commission states that section 1235 "permits an inconsistent statement of a witness to be
used as substantive evidence if the statement is otherwie admissible under the conditions
specified in § 770-which do not include surprise on the part of the party calling the
witness if he is the party offering the inconsistent statement."
Section 1235 admits inconsistent statements of witnesses because the dangers
against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect are largely non-existent.
The declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in regard to
his statements and their subject matter. In many cases, the inconsistent statement
is more likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at the trial because it
was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be
influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation.
Demeanor purposes will be satisfied and Section 1235 will protect against "the turncoat
witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives the party calling him of
evidence essential to his case." Id.
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under California Evidence Code Section 1235. Porter admitted making
this statement to Officer Wade but insisted that he had been telling the

truth as he then believed it to be, both to Officer Wade and at the
preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of the trial, Green took the

stand to categorically deny that he had been involved with drugs or
that he had furnished marijuana to Porter to sell for him.7 0 Green was
convicted by the trial court. On appeal, the California intermediate
appellate court reversed, holding that the admission of Porter's prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of the truth of the
matter asserted therein denied Green his right to confront the witnesses
against him under the rationale of the California Supreme Court's

decision in People v.Johnson.7 7 The California Supreme Court, declaring its decision to be "impelled by recent cases" of the United States
Supreme Court dealing with the sixth amendment right of confronta-

tion,78 held Section 1235 of the new California Evidence Code to be
unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements of a witness to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein, even though the statements had been subject to cross-

examination at a prior preliminary hearing. The California Supreme
Court viewed the right of cross-examination as secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to be the right to cross-exam-

ine before a contemporaneous trier of fact. The United States Supreme
76. Green's testimony does reveal a possible motive for Porter to lie; Green claimed
he had repossessed an automobile he had sold to Porter when Porter failed to keep up
his payments. People v. Green, 71 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1968), rev'd, 399 U.S. 149
(1970).
77. 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111 (1968). In Johnson, the California Supreme Court
held that Section 1235 of the new CAL. Evm. CoDE, insofar as it approves admission of
prior inconsistent statements as proof of the matters stated therein, is unconstitutional
when applied to testimony before a grand jury where the defendant, his counsel, and the
ultimate triers of fact were not present. The complaining witnesses in Johnson, a mother
and daughter, had testified to acts of incest by the father-defendant with the daughter.
However, at trial these witnesses changed their stories, claiming they had lied out of
spite in the grand jury proceedings. Nevertheless, the grand jury testimony had been
admitted under Section 1285 for the truth of the matter asserted therein, and on that
basis the defendant was convicted. The California Supreme Court reversed, declaring that
such use of grand jury testimony violated the confrontation clause of the sixth amend.
ment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In its opinion in
People v. Green, the instant case, the California Supreme Court declared that "Johnson
returned California law . . . to the general common law rule which prevailed prior to
passage of the [new California] Evidence Code, limiting admission of prior inconsistent
statements in criminal cases to impeachment purposes." 70 Cal. 2d at 659, 451 P.2d at 425.
78. 70 Cal. 2d at 785, 451 P.2d at 425. The Court cited Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S,
400 (1965), and Barber v. Page, 890 U.S. 719 (1968), as being the U.S. Supreme Court cases
that "impelled" its decision in Green.
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Court granted the State of California's petition for certiorari7 9 and,
with the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan concurring separately
and Mr. Justice Brennan dissenting, 0 vacated the judgment of the
California Supreme Court and remanded to that court for further proceedings. Mr. Justice White, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
stated that the California Supreme Court was wrong in both of its
major premises: that neither the right to cross-examine Porter at the
trial concerning his prior testimony nor the opportunity to crossexamine Porter at the preliminary hearing satisfied the commands of
the confrontation clause. The Court stated that the confrontation clause
was not a codification of the Hearsay Rule with its exceptions. Appearing anxious to preserve a state's right to experiment with reform of its
hearsay rules, the Court held that the confrontation clause was not
violated by admitting Porter's out-of-court statements as long as he
testified as a witness at the trial in which the prior statements were
offered and was subject to cross-examination. In upholding the constitutionality of Section 1235 of the California Evidence Code, the
Court stated that it did not share the view that prior cross-examination
can never serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for crossexamination contemporaneous with the original statement.,, It therefore relied82 heavily on the fact that Porter had been cross-examined at
8 3
the preliminary hearing.
B.

DUTrON v. EVANS

On the morning of April 17, 1964, the bodies of three Gwinnett County,
Georgia police officers were discovered handcuffed together and lying
in a pine thicket. They had been killed in the early morning hours
from shots fired "into their bodies at extremely close range."8 4 After
79. 596 U.S. 1001 (1970).
80. Mr. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision. 399 U.S. at 170.
81. 399 U.S. at 159.
82. Id. at 165-66.
83. Id. at 170. Porter's conversation with Officer Wade was, unlike the prior statements made by Porter at the preliminary hearing, taken at a time when Green's counsel
was not present and Porter was not subject to cross-examination. Porter's "lapse of
memory" at trial, plus the lack of cross-examination at the time the statement was made
to Officer Wade, may have made him "unavailable" for any cross-examination in which
case Green's right to confrontation would not be satisfied. However, even if Porter was
unavailable for cross-examination as to the prior statements made to Officer Wade, the
error of admitting Wade's testimony may fall within the harmless error category of
Chapman v. California, 586 U.S. 18 (1967).
84. 400 U.S. at 77.
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an intensive investigation that continued for many months, appellee
Evans and two other men, Wade Truett and Venson Williams, were
charged with the murders. A year and a half after the crime, Evans and
Williams were indicted by a grand jury whereas Truett was granted
immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony against the
other two. Evans pleaded not guilty and demanded a separate trial.
His demand was recognized under Georgia law; he was tried before a
jury, convicted and sentenced to death. 85 Evans' conviction was affirmed
by the Georgia Supreme Court, 88 after which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.8 7 Evans then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in a federal district court contending, among other
things, that his sixth amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him had been denied at his trial. His petition was
denied.8 8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the District Court's denial of the writ, holding that the State of
Georgia had denied Evans the right of confrontation.8 9 An appeal was
taken to the United States Supreme Court.9 0
The facts supporting Evans' confrontation contention are not in
dispute. During a lengthy trial, Shaw was called as one of the prosecution's 20 witnesses. 91 Shaw and Williams, the accomplice tried in a
separate trial, had been fellow inmates at the federal penitentiary in

Atlanta, Georgia, at the time Williams was returned to Gwinnett
85. The plurality opinion pointed out that Evans' death penalty could not be
carried out. It was conceded by the State of Georgia at oral argument that the jury was
disqualified under standards of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 891 US. 510 (1968). The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did set aside the conviction of Venson Williams, Evans'
alleged accomplice, on Witherspoon grounds. See Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 804-05
(1968), which also contains a detailed statement of facts applicable to the instant case.
86. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 892, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966).
87. Evans v. Georgia, 385 US. 958 (1966).
88. US. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ga., Frank A. Hooper, J.
89. 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
90. The case was argued twice before the U.S. Supreme Court. 897 U.S. 1060 (1970).
91. The chief prosecution witness was the accomplice Truett, who had been
granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. Truett testified that
he and Williams owned a garage in Hartsville, South Carolina, where they were engaged
in rebuilding wrecked automobiles. Evidently, Williams and Truett had purchased a
year-old maroon Oldsmobile that had been damaged. In the course of planning repairs
they concluded they could not sell the Oldsmobile for a profit if they had to buy spare
parts; therefore, with the help of appellee Evans, they went to Atlanta, Georgia, and
stole a substantially identical automobile. Truett testified that while returning to Harts.
ville they stopped on a back road in Gwinnett County in order to put new registration
plates on the stolen car. Three police officers, responding to a call reporting suspicious
activity, accosted the three culprits. In the course of the questioning, Truett testified that
Evans grabbed one of the officer's guns; the three officers were then bound together with
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County for arraignment for the murder of the three policemen. Shaw
claimed that upon Williams' return to prison from the arraignment, he
had asked Williams, "How did you make out in Court?" and Williams
replied, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch, Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now." Evans' defense counsel made a timely objection to the introduction of this alleged out-of-court statement of Williams on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore violated Evans'
right to confront the witnesses against him. The objection was overruled, and Evans' defense counsel then cross-examined Shaw at length. 92
Shaw's testimony about Williams' statement in the prison was
admitted by the Georgia trial court, and its admission upheld by the
Georgia Supreme Court,93 under a long-standing Georgia statute9 4
which treats any declaration by one of the co-conspirators during the
pendency of the criminal project as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
A majority of the Court could not reach an agreement on the
rationale supporting the decision in the case. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Blackmun subscribed to a plurality opinion written
by Justice Stewart. Justice Harlan concurred separately, and four
justices dissented.9 5 In his plurality opinion, Justice Stewart, although
conceding that the "Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the
evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots," 96 reiterated the
Court's refusal in California v. Green to equate the two rules. The
Court held that the Georgia extension of the co-conspirator exception
their own handcuffs, taken to a wooded spot just off the road, and Evans shot each
policeman a number of times, mostly in the back of the head. The stolen Oldsmobile
was then driven off the road and set afire. See detailed statement of facts in Williams v.
Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. The cross-examination of Shaw by Evans' defense counsel was most effective.
Such serious doubt was cast on Shaw's credibility that a real question exists as to whether
the alleged conversation took place at all. The Court of Appeals observed that Shaw's
testimony was "somewhat incredible." Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d at 828 n.4. Shaw testified
that Williams was talking to him in a normal voice though a ten-by-ten plate-glass window
in a prison hospital door while Williams was lying on a bed in the room facing the wall
and Shaw was outside the room in the hall. Shaw stated the window was covered only
by a wire mesh. It was later brought out in Evans' trial that it was also covered by a
pane of plate glass. Id. See also Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in the instant
case, 400 US. at 90.
93. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1960).
94. "After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by anyone of the
conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all."
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954 rev.).
95. Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by
Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. 400 U.S. at 100.
96. 400 U.S. at 86. See historical development in text accompanying notes 9-27 supra.
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to the Hearsay Rule to include statements made during the conceal
ment phase of the conspiracy did not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause. The Court explained that the narrower federal coconspirator exception, which does not extend to statements made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy but only to statements
made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, was formulated by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making power in the area
of the federal law of evidence and is not meant to define the limits of
the confrontation clause. 97 The Court also stated that admission of
Williams' alleged out-of-court statement to Shaw does not involve
evidence "in any sense 'crucial' or 'devastating.' , At no point in the
plurality opinion does the Court, through Mr. Justice Stewart, ever
claim that appellee Evans was afforded the right to cross-examine his
accomplice, Williams, as to the truth of the out-of-court statement
attributed to Williams by witness Shaw.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFRONTATION
OPINIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE
POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

A. ANALYSIS OF THE 1970 CONFRONTATION OPINIONS
Of the two major 1970 confrontation cases, Dutton v. Evans is the more
important. California v. Green, however, cannot be ignored because it
presages Evans and places the constitutional dilemma in bold relief. 0
While Green authorizes admission of hearsay testimony and specifically
approves California's adoption of a liberalized exception to the Hearsay Rule, the facts of Green are not as compelling as those in Evans to
the theorist who equates confrontation with cross-examination. In
Green, while it is true that witness Porter's claimed memory lapses did
make the witness unavailable under a rather expansive view of the
unavailability concept, he was cross-examined under oath at length at
97. 400 U.S. at 81-82.

98. Id. at 87. Query whether this statement and the "harmless error" treatment of
Shaw's testimony by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun in their concurring
opinions affect at all the continued viability of Chapman v. California, 886 U.S. 18 (1967),
where it was held that before constitutional error can be deemed to be harmless it must
be shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the guilty
verdict obtained.
99. The latest confrontation case, Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) held that a
defendant has not been deprived of his confrontation rights where a codefendant takes
the stand in his own defense denying a prior confession implicating the defendant, and
then proceeds to testify favorable to the defendant. This case does not affect the basic
issues presented in Green and Evans.
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the preliminary hearing. Furthermore, the state did produce him again
at the trial when it introduced those prior inconsistent statements made
at the preliminary hearing and to Officer Wade. 10 0 In short, California
did all that it could to provide defendant Green with an opportunity
to confront the chief witness against him. Only Justice Brennan
viewed confrontation as requiring more. Seven of the eight justices in
Green refused to adopt the view that the overlap between the Hearsay
Rule and its exceptions and the right of confrontation is complete.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that, "Given the similarity of the values
protected [by the Hearsay Rule and the confrontation clause] ...the
modification of a State's hearsay rules to create new exceptions for the
admission of evidence against a defendant, will often raise questions of
compatability with the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation."''1 It is clear that Green did not give a definitive answer to the
extent of the interplay between the common law Hearsay Rule and the
constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him.
In Evans that issue was joined, and in attempting its resolution the
Court found itself evenly split, four-four.
Evans was not an easy case. The plurality opinion allowed admission of an out-of-court statement implicating Evans in a multiple
murder without ever allowing him an opportunity to cross-examine the
out-of-court declarant. Unlike Green, the out-of-court statements in
Evans were never subjected to cross-examination when made; unlike
the situation in Green, Georgia made no attempt to produce the declarant at trial or to provide Evans-during any stage of the criminal
process against him-the right to cross-examine the alleged out-of-court
declarant. While the plurality indicated that there were "indicia of
reliability" 10 2 which supported Georgia's hearsay exception, only two
justices were willing to categorize admission of the out-of-court statements in Evans as "harmess error."' 1 3 Therefore, the Court in Evans,
for the first time since Pointerv. Texas, approved the admission of a
relevant, damaging hearsay statement against an accused without any
attempt to provide the right of cross-examination. In its fear of con100. The Court specifically declined to pass on Officer Wade's testimony as to
Porter's prior statements during interrogation. It noted that there was a substantial

question concerning that testimony because it was not subjected to cross-examination
when made, and because of Porter's memory lapse at trial, it could be considered to
have never been subjected to the test of cross-examination. 399 U.S. at 169 n.18.
101. 399 U.S. at 156.

102. 400 U.S. at 89.
103. See Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger.
400 U.S. at 90.
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stitutionalizing the Hearsay Rule, the Court balanced away the mandatory language of the Constitution guaranteeing a criminal defendant
the "right to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'10 4 Four
"pragmatists,"'105 fearful of the results of constitutionalization of the
Hearsay Rule, diluted the sixth amendment without constitutional
justification. Four constitutional "purists,"'10 while not willing to say
there can never be exceptions to the Hearsay Rule which will satisfy
the confrontation clause, nevertheless held that the clear constitutional
mandate was not carried out in Evans. The purists pointed out that
every member of the Court has agreed that cross-examination is at
least an element of confrontation. They further insisted that no semblance of the right of confrontation was present in Evans, 07 and as.
serted that there was no justification for its absence. Justice Harlan,
in both Green and Evans, saw the constitutional dilemma faced by the
Court and attempted twice to articulate a constitutional meaning for
confrontation that met the demands of the pragmatists for decisions
which would not stifle state hearsay reforms and also met the demands
of the purists that a basic constitutional right not be read out of
existence. It is essential to examine in some detail the view of the
members of the Supreme Court who decided the 1970 confrontation
cases in order to appreciate the constitutional dilemma facing the
Court.
B.

OPINIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL JusTCES

1. The Pragmatists
Mr. Justice White: Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in
Californiav. Green and subscribed to the plurality opinion in Dutton v.
Evans. He attempted to confine his opinion in Green to the narrow
question of whether a defendant's constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him is necessarily inconsistent with the
position taken in Section 1235 of the California Evidence Code.10 8 He
104. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI, § 1.
105. The writer has adopted the terms "pragmatist" and "purist" to identify the
two groups of justices represented in the plurality and dissenting opinions in Evans. These
terms are adopted only for purposes of convenience and easy reader identification and arc
not intended to import to any justice any particular judicial philosophy.
106. Id.
107. Not one of the values which the confrontation clause was intended to protect
was present in Evans. The out-of-court declarant, Williams, was never at any time put
under oath; he was never placed "face-to-face" with Evans; no trier of fact ever observed
his demeanor; and he was not cross-examined. Furthermore, at no time did Georgia ever
excuse his absence under any definition of "unavailability."
108. See note 75 supra.
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conceded "that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are gener9 and, from
ally designed to protect similar values .... -10
his discussion
of the cross-examination of Porter at the preliminary hearing, it seems
clear that Justice White would agree that cross-examination is one of
those "similar values" protected by both the Hearsay Rule and the
sixth amendment. However, he contended that the overlap between the
confrontation clause and the Hearsay Rule is not complete. He pointed
out that violations of confrontation have been found even though the
statements in question were admitted under an "arguably recognized
hearsay exception,"11 0 and he asserted that the converse can also be
true. In quoting the famous paragraph in Mattox v. United States"' as
to the primary object of confrontation, Mr. Justice White asserted that
"it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that
112
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."
Therefore, he found no objection to the California procedure where
Porter was cross-examined at the preliminary hearing and was presented at the trial by the State for questioning about his prior inconsistent statements. In White's view, Porter was literally confronted by
defendant Green. While he claimed that the literal right to face an
accuser is the core value of confrontation, Mr. Justice White did set up
three of its other purposes: (1) it insures that the witness will give his
statement under oath; (2) it forces the witness to submit to crossexamination; 113 and (3) it permits the trier of fact to observe the
demeanor of the witness as he makes his statement. 1 4 After examining
the facts of Green in light of the above listed purposes of confrontation,
Mr. Justice White concluded that Green was not denied the right to
confront Porter in any constitutional sense. He made it clear that the
Court was not mapping out a theory of the confrontation clause that
would determine the validity of all hearsay exceptions, that hearsay and
confrontation are not the same, and that the confrontation clause does
not constitutionalize the Hearsay Rule. Justice White accepted the
existence of exceptions to the Hearsay Rule which will allow admission of hearsay evidence. 1 5 His flexibility in regard to exceptions to
109. 899 U.S. at 155.
110. Id. at 156.
111. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
112. 899 Us. at 157.
113. Here Mr. Justice White quotes Wigmore's statement that cross-examination is
the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 399 US. at 158. See 5
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 1867, at 29 for original source material.
114. While he does not list presence as one of the values of confrontation, Mr.
Justice White joined the opinion of the Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
115. He cites favorably Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), which approves
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the Hearsay Rule is emphasized by his concurrence in the plurality
opinion in Evans which approved the broad Georgia co-conspirator
exception despite the absence of the alleged purposes of confrontation
listed in Green. Mr. Justice White can be considered a member of
the pragmatist group who desires to avoid constitutionalization of the
Hearsay Rule.
Chief Justice Burger: The Chief Justice concurred in the majority
opinion in Green and in the plurality opinion in Evans. It is apparent
that he is a leading pragmatist on the Court as far as the right of
confrontation is concerned. His concurring opinion in Green emphasized the importance of "allowing the States to experiment and
innovate, especially in the area of criminal justice."" 16 He further
asserted that federal authority should never be used as a "ramrod"
to compel conformity. The Chief Justice joined Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in Evans. Thus, these two justices viewed Shaw's
testimony about the accomplice Williams as "harmless error" under
Chapman v. California.117It seems likely that the Chief Justice would
be hesitant to find any rational hearsay exception of any state to be
in violation of the confrontation clause.
Mr. Justice Blackmun: Mr. Justice Blacklmun, as the newest member of the Court, did not participate in the decision in Green. However,
he subscribed to the plurality opinion in Evans and added a concurring
opinion finding harmless error in the admission of accomplice Williams' out-of-court statement."" It must be assumed that he, along
with the Chief Justice, would be one of the most unwilling members
of the Court to find constitutional problems with any recognized state
hearsay exception.
Mr. Justice Stewart: Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion for the Court in Evans and subscribed to the majority opinion in
Green. The opinion in Evans began by citing Pointerv. Texas"09 and
purported to agree with its holding that the right of an accused to
the prior testimony exception to the Hearsay Rule where a witness had died between the
first and second trial. 399 U.S. at 165.
116. 399 U.S. at 171.
117. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

118. His "theory" seemed to be that it was so unlikely that witness Shaw was telling
the truth about Williams ever uttering the statement attributed to him that no "normal
jury" could have believed Shaw and therefore cross-examination was unnecessary as the
testimony could not have affected the jury's decision. 400 U.S. at 91. But see Mr. Justice
Marshall's disposal of this "harmless error" theory in his dissenting opinion in Evans, 400
U.S. at 108-09; See also Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, id. at 93-94.
119. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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confront witnesses against him is a fundamental right made obligatory
on the states by the fourteenth amendment. However, Justice Stewart
then stated that no one could argue that the confrontation clause
prohibits the introduction of all hearsay evidence. 120 He noted that
the appellee's argument was not to prohibit admission of all hearsay,
but rather to require the Court to reappraise every exception to the
Hearsay Rule, no matter how long established, unless it was supported
by "salient and cogent reasons.' ' 12 1 However, Justice Stewart declined
to conduct what he termed a "constitutional reassessment" of all established state and federal hearsay exceptions. Instead, he attempted to
restrict the plurality opinion to the issue of the constitutionality of
Georgia's broad co-conspirator exception. He dealt extensively with
the proposition that the narrower federal co-conspirator exception was
adopted by the Court under its rule-making power in the area of the
federal law of evidence. He asserted that the sixth amendment does
not require the states to follow the narrower federal exception. He then
discussed previous confrontation decisions of the Court and concluded
that:
It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.
But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so
now. We confine ourselves, instead, to deciding the case before
us.

12 2

After attempting to distinguish the previous confrontation decisions
of the Court, 23 he concluded that the Georgia hearsay exception involved could have many applications consistent with the confrontation
clause and that its application in Evans did not violate the Constitution. While he discussed the ability of the defendant to cross-examine
the witness Shaw, at no time did he claim that there was any confron120.

Wr. Justice Stewart cited Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), which

recognized the admissibility of dying dedarations and prior testimony where a witness at
an earlier trial had died, to support his position that there are occasions where the
admission of hearsay evidence does not violate the sixth amendment.
121. 400 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1968).
122. 400 U.S. at 86.
123. This case does not involve evidence in any sense "crucial" or "devastating,"
as did all the cases just discussed. It does not involve the use, or misuse, of a
confession made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation, as did
Douglas, Brookhart, Bruton, and Roberts. It does not involve any suggestion of
prosecutorial misconduct or even negligence, as did Pointer,Douglas, and Barber.
It does not involve the use by the prosecution of a paper transcript, as did
Pointer, Brookhart, and Barber. It does not involve a joint trial, as did Bruton

and Roberts. And it certainly does not involve the wholesale denial of crossexamination, as did Brookhart.
400 U.S. at 87.
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tation of the out-of-court declarant Williams or that the state had any
reason for not producing him. His opinion asserted that Williams'
statement "was spontaneous" and "against his penal interest."'124 These
"indicia of reliability" were determinative for Justice Stewart as to
whether a statement may be placed before a jury "though there [was]
no confrontation of the declarant."'1 25 Justice Stewart concluded by
defining confrontation in such a way as to make it difficult to ever
find a hearsay exception, no matter how broad, that violates the confrontation clause as long as there are "indicia of reliability." It is
essential to look at the words used by Justice Stewart in Evans to describe the right of confrontation, a right referred to at the beginning
of his opinion as fundamental.
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of
the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that the "trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement."1 26
Thus, in order to achieve a desired result, Justice Stewart interpreted
the constitutional command that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against him,"' 2 7 as nothing more than a "practical concern" that the
trier of fact has a "satisfactory" basis for evaluating the truth of an outof-court statement. Not one of the purposes of the confrontation clause
enumerated by the Court in Green was met in Evans: (1) no oath was
administered to Williams; (2) his demeanor was not observed; (3) he
was not cross-examined; and, (4) the "literal right to 'confront' the
witness at the time of trial [that] forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause,"' 28 was not afforded the defendant. Finally, there was no showing that declarant Williams was unavailable.
It is submitted that the test of "indicia of reliability" used in Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion to test the constitutionality of a state's hearsay exceptions is imprecise and will result in a balancing away of the
confrontation clause in favor of a state's evidentiary rulings in almost
every close case in which it is applied.
Evans was tried for the brutal murder of three police officers and,
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id, (emphasis added).
U.. CONsr. amend. VI, § 1 (emphasis added).
399 US. at 157 (emphasis added).
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in the context of the facts, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded his opinion
by citing Justice Cardozo's famous statement in Snyder v. Massachusetts129 that discredit will be visited on the great fourteenth amendment
immunities if "gossamer possibilities of prejudice" are used to "set the
guilty free."' 1 30 Evans was not granted his constitutional right to confront Williams, no reason was advanced by Georgia for failing to call
Williams, seven members of the Court could not conclude that the
out-of-court statement was of such low value that its admission would
amount to "harmless error," yet that state's broad hearsay exception
was held not to violate the constitution. To obtain a practical result,
a basic constitutional right was not enforced. Thus, the issue between
the pragmatists and the purists was joined.
2. The Constitutional Purists
Mr. Justice Brennan: Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the only dissenting
opinion in Green and joined the dissent in Evans. He is the justice
who would seem most likely to carry out the literal commands of
the confrontation clause. In Green he indicated that both of Porter's
prior inconsistent statements were unconstitutionally admitted into
testimony, placing great emphasis on the demeanor and cross-examination purposes of confrontation. He vigorously defended the proposition
advanced in Barber v. Page that "[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine
and... for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness."13
' Justice
Brennan was particularly critical of the majority's notion that crossexamination at the preliminary hearing can be considered an effective
substitute for cross-examination at trial. He pointed out that the
preliminary hearing is normally "a rather perfunctory uncontested
proceeding," citing the California appellate court opinion, 132 and
that the confrontation clause cannot be satisfied by a face-to-face encounter at that time. 133 Justice Brennan asserted that acceptance of
129. 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
130. 400 U.S. at 89-90.
131. 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
132. 399 U.S. at 196, citing People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743-44, 63 Cal.

Rptr. 471, 475 (1967).
133. He contended that: (1) the preliminary hearing is to establish probable cause,
not guilt, and therefore defense counsel's motive for serious cross-examination is diminished; (2) defense counsel is not eager to disclose his case in advance by serious crossexamination; (3) trial calendars do not easily accommodate long preliminary hearings;
(4) there had been inadequate time to prepare; and (5) the fact finder sees the cross-

examination from a sterile record and has not observed the demeanor of the witnesses. 399
U.S. at 196-97.
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cross-examination at the preliminary hearing as an adequate substitute
for cross-examination at trial is to negate the demeanor purpose of
the confrontation clause. Furthermore, he felt that the Court's ruling
in Green would have "unsettling effects" on the nature and conduct
of future preliminary hearings because it would: (1) invite lengthy
cross-examinations; (2) tend to develop preliminary hearings into fullscale trials; and (3) invite requests for delay to add preparation time.
Justice Brennan finally discussed the unavailability concept in light of
witness Porter's memory lapse and concluded that there was no mean34
ingful confrontation of that witness.
A final dimension can be added to Mr. Justice Brennan's view
of confrontation. He concurred separately in Illinois v. Allen, 185 after
joining the majority opinion which held that a defendant could be
barred from his own trial if he continued his disruptive behavior after
a warning. He urged that special steps should be taken even in the
extreme Allen situation to allow a defendant to communicate with his
counsel. Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan disagrees with those pragmatists
who would narrowly interpret the right of confrontation in order to
allow state experimentation. Never once in his dissent did Mr. Justice
Brennan mention the spectre of constitutionalization of the Hearsay
Rule that disturbed the pragmatists in the 1970 confrontation cases.
He joined the dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall in Evans where it was
agreed that some exceptions to the Hearsay Rule might satisfy the
confrontation clause; but, the thrust of his dissent in Green indicated
that the constitutionalization argument is not persuasive for him.
Mr. Justice Black: While Mr. Justice Black joined the majority
in Green and the dissent in Evans, his views as to the right of confrontation can be seen in his earlier confrontation opinions. In In re
Oliver,13 6 long before Pointer v. Texas incorporated the confrontation
clause into the fourteenth amendment, he said that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated by a trial dispensing
with basic confrontation rights. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Pointer which followed the theory he first set out in Adamson
v. California,137 that the Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment by the due process clause and applied
134. Id. at 198-99, 202-03.

135. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
136. 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (reversed a summary contempt conviction based on secret
testimony before a one-man grand jury, where the accused had never heard any of the
testimony against him).
137. 332 US. 46 (1947).
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to the states.188 Justice Black is unlikely to agree that "practical" considerations based on "indicia of reliability" can void a basic constitutional command. However, dicta in Pointer also established that his
decision might have been different if defendant Pointer had had a
right of cross-examination at a full-fledged preliminary hearing. Crossexamination at such a hearing was present in Green and Justice Black
concurred in the result 3 9 Mr. Justice Black's strong beliefs about the
right of confrontation are seen in Brookhart v. Janis, 40 where he
asserted that denial of the right of cross-examination "is constitutional
error of the first magnitude."' 14 He equates confrontation with crossexamination and views cross-examination as the fundamental value
preserved by the confrontation clause.
Mr. Justice Douglas: Mr. Justice Douglas subscribed to the majority opinion in Green but, with Justice Black, joined the dissenters
in Evans. He would apparently preserve a defendant's right to confrontation in close cases where conflict arises with any state hearsay
exception. While he has not written as extensively as Justice Black
in the confrontation area, Justice Douglas has to be placed in the
camp of the constitutional purists. Although he held in Harrington
v. California4 that confessions introduced in seeming violation of
the Bruton doctrine will not necessarily be cause for reversal where
there is "overwhelming" support for conviction, his actual view of the
right to confrontation must be determined from several cases: he joined
the majority in Bruton,143 which held that the admission of evidence
categorized by the trial judge as inadmissible in his charge to the jury
nevertheless violated Bruton's right of cross-examination secured by
the confrontation clause; he concurred in Barberv. Page,'" which held
that because the state was negligent in procuring a codefendant's pres138. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1950); Frankfurter, Memorandum on
"Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 746 (1965); see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961);
Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
139. However, it should be noted that Mr. Justice Black did concur in Mr. Justice
Marshall's dissent in Dutton v. Evans where it is asserted that even a preliminary hearing
cross-examination will not satisfy the confrontation clause where the witness who testified
at the preliminary hearing is available to be called at trial and is not so called. 400 U.S.
at 101.
140. 884 U.S. 1 (1966) (a "waiver" of constitutional rights was voided as not being
intelligently made).
141. Id. at 3.

142. 895 US. 250 (1969).
143. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
144. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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ence he was not "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation clause
and that there was no waiver of the right to confrontation; he concurred in both Pointer v. Texas145 and Douglas v. Alabama;140 and
finally, he subscribed to the dissent in Evans.
Mr. Justice Marshall: Mr. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent in
Evans and, while joining the majority in Green, he should be viewed
in light of Evans as a constitutional purist.
The dissenting views of Justice Marshall in Evans, when compared
with those in the plurality opinion, point up the division on the Court
as to the meaning of confrontation. For Justice Marshall, the right
to confrontation means that incriminatory extrajudicial statements of
an alleged accomplice (which he asserted are inherently prejudicial)
must not be introduced without an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. Justice Marshall, unlike Justice Stewart, believed that crossexamination of the declarant Williams in Evans could affect the jury's
view of the situation as presented by witness Shaw. He saw in Evans
the unanswered questions which the cross-examination of witnesses is
meant to answer: what did the declarant say, what did he mean, and
was it the truth?
He saw the plurality opinion as wrong in limiting the right to
confrontation to certain circumstances and wrong in stating that "differences" between Evans and prior cases (the declarant's alleged statement was not made during an official interrogation; it was not in
transcript form; it was not introduced at a joint trial) are dispositive
for confrontation purposes.
For Justice Marshall, the Georgia co-conspirator exception had to
give way to a defendant's right to confrontation. He asserted that prior
decisions recognize at least that cross-examination is included in the
right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against
him, and that a defendant is denied his constitutional rights when a
state comes forward with no satisfactory justification for the denial of
cross-examination. Viewing the statement of the declarant Williams
to be suspect and highly damaging, Marshall saw its admission as one
of the threats to a fair trial against which the right to confrontation
was directed. He claimed that the plurality justices, in seeking "indicia
of reliability," have "sunk"' 47 the confrontation clause. Justice Marshall felt that under the plurality's test, the confrontation clause would
145. 880 U.S. 400 (1965).
146. 880 US. 415 (1965).
147. 400 U.S. at 110.
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have no independent vitality in protecting a criminal defendant against

the use of extrajudicial statements not subject to cross-examination
and not exposed to a jury assessment of the declarant's demeanor at
trial. In emphasizing the right of cross-examination, Justice Marshall
denied that his conception of the right of confrontation poses the

spectre of a rampaging confrontation clause trampling all flexibility
and innovation in a state's law of evidence. 148 But on the other hand,
Justice Marshall believed that the confrontation clause prohibits use
of an incriminatory extrajudicial statement of an alleged accomplice
unless there has been an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
regardless of the existence of a recognized hearsay exception.
3. Mr. justice Harlan-The Troubled Theorist
Justice Harlan was impelled toward the results achieved by the pragmatists (he concurred separately in both Californiav. Green and Dutton
v. Evans) but was dismayed by their apparent lack of any cohesive
theory of confrontation to support such results. He granted the logic
of the purists' position but feared the results achieved by pursuit of
that logic. 149 He attempted in both Green and Evans to construct a
definition of hearsay that would support practical results and yet deal
fairly with a constitutional mandate. While his views as to the core
meaning of confrontation changed markedly in the six month period
between the two cases, he pursued his goal of a workable constitutional
theory.
a. The availability interpretation: Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Green exhorted the Court to confront squarely the confrontation clause. He stated that the holding of the California Supreme
Court is a direct result of an "understandable misconception" of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and that the narrow holding in
Green is not the best way to correct this misinterpretation. The misinterpretation consists of an indiscriminate equation of confrontation
with cross-examination.150 Justice Harlan asserted that the confrontation-cross-examination equation left ambiguous the extent to which
"the Sixth Amendment 'constitutionalizes' the hearsay rule of the
common law." 15
148. He termed that as "a prospect more frightening than real." 400 U.S. at 105-06
n.7; and he later stated "[t]hat spectre is only a spectre." Id. at 110.
149. He claimed the dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall in Dutton v. Evans is pushng
the dissenters to a prohibition on the use of all hearsay, even if the dissenters are not
willing to embrace that position at this time. 400 US. at 95.
150. 599 US. at 172.
151. Id. at 173.
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He therefore proposed to take a "fresh look at the constitutional
concept of 'confrontation,' " without letting stare decisis "stand in the
way. ' 152 In proposing his fresh look, Justice Harlan found that history
gave little insight into the intended scope of the confrontation clause.1 8
Nevertheless, for Justice Harlan, a believer in the "federal approach,"
the stakes are so high that the effort of reformulation of confrontation
to avoid the cross-examination equation is necessary. He feared "perpetuation of an unworkable rule."'" After taking his fresh look in
Green, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the confrontation clause
should be confined to an "availability rule," one that requires production of a witness when he is available to testify. 155 In Green, he
criticized Wigmore's view of confrontation' 5 6 and claimed historical
support for the proposition that availability, not cross-examination, underlies the confrontation right.157 His interpretation of availability as
confrontation suggests simply that a state should produce a witness
and afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine him "when
the declarant is available."'5 8 Under his availability interpretation, it
is easy in Green for Justice Harlan to find for California: the prosecution did produce its chief witness Porter and did make him available
for trial confrontation. He treated the demeanor and oath purposes
of the traditional view of confrontation as minor considerations.
b. The cross-examining procedure-due process interpretation:
It took just six months for Mr. Justice Harlan to eschew his own "availability" interpretation of confrontation and conclude in Evans that,
absent impelling linguistic or historical evidence, his availability test
152. Id.
153. See text accompanying notes 9-27 supra for historical development of confrontation and hearsay.
154. 399 U.S. at 173 n.4, citing Swift & Company v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965). He stated: "This is not merely a case of prior decisions that may have been
incorrectly decided or rationalized. The unworkability of constitutionalizing any aspect
of the conventional hearsay rule means what is at stake is the future of sound constitutional development in this area." Id.
155. If his "availability" conception of confrontation is not tenable under the sixth
amendment law, Mr. Justice Harlan asserts that it should be agreeable under the fourteenth amendment due process dause-which is where he insists, state cases of this kind
should be judged anyway. Id. at 174.
156. Wigmore equated confrontation with cross-examination, then equated the Hearsay Rule with the test of cross-examination and concluded that the confrontation clause
was intended to constitutionalize the Hearsay Rule and all its exceptions at common law.
See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra for an extensive critique of the Wigmore theories of hearsay, cross-examination, and confrontation.
157. Justice Harlan reiterated his theme that Justice Black's "incorporation" doetrine, which has been gaining favor, is at the botton of the present dilemma which
threatens constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions. Id. at 184.
158. Id. at 186.
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is not a happy one to attribute to the framers of the Constitution. The
trouble he saw with availability as the core doctrine of confrontation
is founded in his firm commitment to federalism. He believed that
any rule requiring production of witnesses would curtail new developments in the law of evidence which might eliminate production of
unnecessary witnesses and thus streamline the trial process. He cited
as examples of such developments the exception to the Hearsay Rule
for official statements, learned treatises, trade reports, and business
records.'5 9
Nevertheless, despite unhappiness with his own availability theory, Justice Harlan was equally disturbed in Evans and Green with the
assumption that the confrontation clause is intended to prevent overly
broad exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. However, in his second fresh
look at the problem, Justice Harlan saw merit in Wigmore's theory,
and cited Wigmore as direct authority for his new theory of confrontation-that the sixth amendment confrontation clause requires only
that a certain mode of procedure, i.e. a cross-examining procedure,
should be utilized in evaluating testimony that the ordinary law of
evidence has determined is admissible. 6 0 Confrontation, claimed Justice Harlan, should not be confused with the kinds of statements, such
as dying declarations, which the law of evidence permits into court.
Therefore, in Evans, Justice Harlan to a limited degree embraced
Wigmore's previously criticized equation of cross-examination with
confrontation. Unlike the Hearsay Rule which is used to pass on the
admissibility of evidence, Justice Harlan's new confrontation theory
only requires that evidence be subjected to a cross-examining procedure
once it is admitted.16t Mr. Justice Harlan's new theory helped avoid
the weakness he saw in present confrontation interpretation. He felt
that the confrontation clause as traditionally construed by the Court is
simply inappropriate "for taking into account the numerous factors
that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of
evidence.

1 62

He viewed the due process clause of the fifth and four-

teenth amendments as far more appropriate for judging standards re159. 400 U.S. at 95-96.
160. Id. at 94.
161. As discussed in note 26 supra Wigmore's paragraph relied on by Mr. Justice
Harlan to support his "cross-examination procedure theory" does not seem consistent
with the primary Wigmore theory which stated that both hearsay and confrontation
are premised on cross-examination and that the confrontation clause constitutionalizes
the Hearsay Rule and its exceptions.
162. 400 U.S. at 96. He criticized the plurality opinion for failing to explain the
standard by which it judged witness Shaw's statement, or for failing to show how the
5tandpxd can be squared with the "absolute command" of the confrontation clause. Id.
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lating to the constitutionality of federal and state rules of evidence. By
interpreting confrontation as requiring only a cross-examining procedure after admissibility has been determined by evidentiary rules,
Mr. Justice Harlan has simplified the Court's task. It now must merely
judge evidence rules by familiar due process standards. He obviously
felt that his solution more nearly comports with the traditional role
of the Court in relation to state procedural rules and preserves to the
states a right to experiment and innovate in their evidentiary law.0 3
Using this new cross-examining procedure-due process interpretation,
Mr. Justice Harlan could reach the same result as the plurality opinion
reached in Evans in, what was for him, a far more comfortable constitutional framework. He also pointed out that his theory of reliance on
the due process clause has the virtue of subjecting a state's rules of
evidence to the same constitutional scrutiny regardless of whether those
evidentiary rules are employed in civil or criminal cases.10 4 In applying
his new test in Evans, Mr. Justice Harlan found that although Georgia's
broad co-conspirator exception to the Hearsay Rule does not necessarily
appeal to him (he seemed to prefer the more narrow federal exception),
the narrower federal rule cannot be said to be essential to a fair trial.
This takes care of the admission problem of declarant Williams' out-ofcourt statement. Once admitted through witness Shaw, the out-of-court
statement was subjected to a cross-examining procedure by the extensive
cross-examination conducted of witness Shaw.
In summary, there is a four-four split on the Court between those
who would restrict the meaning of confrontation to achieve practical
results and those who would adhere to the constitutional mandate regardless of the impact on a state's evidentiary law. Only Mr. Justice
Harlan attempted to bridge theory with practicality by advancing two
new alternative interpretations of confrontation. It is hoped that the
chart below will aid the reader in better understanding the individual
opinions.165
IV.

A CRITIQUE: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
THE DUTTON V. EVANS DILEMMA

There are at least six possible approaches in determining to what extent, if any, the confrontation clause constitutionalizes the Hearsay
163. He again candidly recognized that his new theory is not "consistent" with
many of the things said in the Court's prior cases. Id. at 97.
164. Id. at 97 n.4.
165. See following page.
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Rule.66 The advantages and disadvantages of each approach to the
Dutton v. Evans dilemma will be discussed and a preferred solution will
be suggested.
A.

THE FEDERALIST APPROACH

The federalist is willing to define narrowly the confrontation clause
and, where any question arises between an accused's claim of denial of
confrontation rights and a rational exception to a state's Hearsay Rule,
will favor the state rule. It appears that the pragmatic approach of the
plurality opinion in Evans offers a federalist-oriented test. The constitutional mandate was interpreted as only a "practical" concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process; in carrying out that "concern" the Court need only assure itself that the trier of fact had a
"satisfactory basis" for determining the accuracy of the challenged evidence. 16 7 The obvious advantage of this approach is that it comports
with the concept of federalism that claims for the states that which is
not specifically delegated to the federal government. To the federalist,
the Constitution allows each state to adopt its own body of evidentiary
law and, unless there are compelling reasons, forbids the federal courts
from imposing their own views of hearsay on the states. The major
disadvantage is that a federalist would be inclined to erase a constitutional command that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to confront the witnesses against him."',6 The test
employed in Evans would balance away a basic constitutional right as
long as any state hearsay exception is supported by some "indicia of
reliability."169
166. E. CLEARIY & J. STRaoN, EVIDENCE 523 (1969) in a perceptive note written prior
to the 1970 confrontation cases, listed three conclusions to the question of how far the
confrontation clause goes in constitutionalizing the Hearsay Rule: (1) The present exceptions to the Hearsay Rule are constitutional but the confrontation clause bars further
exceptions; (2) Traditional hearsay exceptions are not necessarily exempt from the confrontation clause; (3) Further rulings are uncertain because the ultimate purpose of the
Hearsay Rule is to insure reliability of evidence and the ultimate purpose of the confrontation clause is to insure a certain standard of prosecutorial behavior.
167. See detailed discussion of the Evans plurality test, text accompanying notes 12735 supra where views of Mr. Justice Stewart are reviewed in detail. In concluding by citing
Mr. Justice Cardozo's fear that the criminal law and fourteenth amendment rights will
be brought into contempt if guilty men are set free under gossamer possibilities of prejudice, the plurality opinion seems to be assuring that the sixth amendment confrontation
clause will be protected from disrepute by the simple expedient of not applying it in
difficult cases.
168. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, § 1 (emphasis added).
169. Surprisingly enough, in the first state confrontation case decided after Evans,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in applying the ambiguous "indicia of reliability" test
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Tim CONSTITUTIONAL PUrIST APPROACH

This approach is perhaps best illustrated by Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissent in California v. Green and the California Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion in the same case. The purist accepts Wigmore's
broad equation of confrontation with cross-examination and the notion
that the confrontation clause really did constitutionalize a prohibition
on hearsay evidence in criminal trials unless tested by cross-examination.170 The purist approach has the advantage of giving full vigor to
the confrontation clause. Following established constitutional doctrine,
any state hearsay exception that allows admission of evidence in a
criminal trial that does not meet the test of contemporaneous crossexamination would have to fall. The direct equation made by the purist
between confrontation and cross-examination is supported by decisional
law and commentators. However, the disadvantage of this approach is
that, as feared by the plurality justices and Mr. Justice Harlan in Evans,
171
it leads inexorably to constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule.
Considering the efforts expended in reforming the Hearsay Rule and its
exceptions, the purist approach seems to be one that will not be accepted gracefully. Of course, even the purist would have to recognize
some exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. The refusal to accept any hearsay
evidence in criminal trials would make ordinary trial procedure, as we
know it, impossible.
C.

TIE AvAILABILITY APPROACH

This approach to the interpretation of the confrontation clause, designed to avoid the polar interpretations advocated by the pragmatists
and purists, was advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring
found that under the facts of the case before them the res gestae remarks of child witnesses
in a murder trial did violate the confrontation rights of the defendant. State v. Lunn,
- N. Mex. -, 484 P.2d 368 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971). The court found that the "indicia of
reliability" holding in Evans was based on four indicia: (1) Williams' statement was spontaneous and against his penal interest; (2) the statement contained no assertions about

past fact; (3) Williams' knowledge of the other participants was established by other
facts; (4) the possibility that the statement was found on faulty recollection is remote. In
the New Mexico case, the court stated that three of the four types of "indicia of reliability"
found in Dutton v. Evans were missing in the res gestae remarks before it.
170. While willing to accept this part of the Wigmore thesis, adherents to this approach would not be willing to accept Wigmore's conclusion that the Hearsay Rule, with
all its present exceptions and all the exceptions yet to be adopted, is constitutionalized. 5
WIGWoRa, supra note 8 § 1397, at 130-31. This purist approach would exclude almost all
hearsay unless there has been contemporaneous cross-examination before the ultimate
trier of fact.
171. Without necessarily accepting present exceptions to that rule.
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opinion in Green. This interpretation of confrontation adopts the
position advocated in a Yale Law Journal Comment written after
Pointerv. Texas.172 It would convert the confrontation clause into "a
canon of prosecutorial behavior 173 and, as such, is ingenious. 74 Its
adoption would mean that a constitutional theory of confrontation
would be available that did not threaten to constitutionalize the entire
Hearsay Rule-thus satisfying the pragmatists on the Court. Furthermore, a theory of confrontation would exist that would prevent the
clause from being erased by a federalist approach that would balance
away individual rights in favor of a state's interest in its own evidentiary
rules. It would let states know of their burden to produce all available
witnesses and would be easy to apply. Its disadvantage is that it ignores
centuries of history and decisional law equating confrontation with
the protection of the right of cross-examination. Also, as Mr. Justice
Harlan himself points out in his concurring opinion in Evans, a rule
requiring production of available witnesses would in some ways curtail
the federalist approach that encourages a state's ability to change its
evidentiary rules. Such a rule would hamper exceptions that excuse
witnesses when their presence would be inconvenient or of small utility
to the defendant. 175
The important contribution of this Harlan approach is to elevate
the notion of availability from an unarticulated concept underlying
172.

75 YALE LJ. 1434 (1966).

173. Id. at 1439.
174. While availability is first seen in full bloom in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Green, in Barber v. Page the Court wrote a confrontation opinion stressing
the component of availability. Mr. Justice Marshall held for the Court in Barber that
Oklahoma was negligent in not procuring Woods' presence at trial, thus the witness was
not "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation clause, and Barber did not waive his
right to confrontation. Justice Marshall specifically stated that the state made no effort
to obtain Woods' presence at trial and that he was not unavailable for purposes of any
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made
a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. He was willing to state that there may
be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness
at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, "but this is not such a case." In California v.
Green, Justice Harlan analyzed many past cases, trying to fit them into his availability
mould. Especially important is Harlan's approach to West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258
(1904). Harlan believed the availability focus of the Court was seen in West's discussion
of the common law rule that admitted deposition testimony "upon proof being made to
the satisfaction of the Court that the witness was, at the time of the trial, dead, insane,
too illever to be expected to attend the trial, or kept away by the connivance of the
defendant." 399 U.S. at 183.
175. Mr. Justice Harlan cites growth of business records exceptions as one area of
innovation that would be retarded. 400 U.S. at 96.
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some confrontation cases to its rightful place as one of the important
components of confrontation.
D.

THE

DUE PROCESS-CROSS-EXAMINING

PROCEDURE APPROACH

This is the second interpretation of the confrontation clause advanced
by Mr. Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan rejected the availability concept
he proposed in California v. Green. Citing a paragraph from Wigmore,176 he proposed that the confrontation clause be considered nothing more than a rule requiring a cross-examining procedure to test
evidence after traditional evidentiary rules have determined that the
item of evidence is admissible. Justice Harlan asserted that the confrontation clause, so limited, would no longer threaten evidentiary
reformers and would be a constitutional right easily applied. He contended that the admissibility of an item of evidence should depend
solely on a state's evidentiary rules without regard to the confrontation
clause. For example, a hearsay exception is a state evidentiary rule
dealing with admissibility and once it has been determined that under
the hearsay exception an item of evidence is admissible, only then would
the confrontation clause come into play. Its function would be to
determine that an item of evidence after being admitted was subjected
to a cross-examining procedure. This would leave a state's evidentiary
rules dealing with admissibility of evidence to be judged by familiar
77
fourteenth amendment due process standards.
However, this suggested approach is based on a faulty premise.
While Wigmore's paragraph seems to support Justice Harlan's position,
close attention to the entire Wigmore theory of the confrontation
clause's constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule does not bear out
Justice Harlan's thesis that confrontation requires only a cross-examining procedure and is not to be used to test admissibility. 178 Whether or
176. See note 26 supra setting out verbatim the Wigmore paragraph relied on.
177. One commentator asserts that ". . . to suggest that the accused is sufficiently protected by the due process clause would be to regard the confrontation clause merely as

a constitutional anachronism." Note, supra note 19, at 741, 743.
178. See detailed analysis of Wigmore's theory, text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
It should be noted that Dean Wigmore defines confrontation as guaranteeing the opportunity of cross-examination; he defines the Hearsay Rule's essential element as the test
of cross-examination. Then he concludes that the confrontation clause "constitutionalizes"

the Hearsay Rule and that the two rules are therefore the same rule by a different name.
If both rules are equated with cross-examination and are in reality one rule with two

names, then how can the Hearsay Rule be a rule testing admissibility of evidence while
confrontation is a rule dealing only with a cross-examining procedure after admission
of evidence and having nothing to do with testing admissibility? Courts for years have
followed the Wigmore theory equating the two rules; they do not follow this obscure
paragraph on cross-examining procedure,
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not Wigmore's paragraph supports the cross-examining procedure thesis, it has been clear for centuries that confrontation does deal with
admissibility. If an accused cannot confront the witnesses against him,
their testimony cannot be admitted. That kind of decisional authority
cannot be wiped out by an obscure paragraph in Wigmore's treatise
that may or may not support the cross-examining procedure thesis.
Even if the confrontation clause were interpreted only as dealing
with a cross-examining procedure after admissibility, Justice Harlan's
use of the due process clause to test state evidentiary rules may not be
the solution it first seems. It is possible, in light of Pointerv. Texas, that
the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right applicable to the
states through that same due process clause. Therefore, the due process
clause itself will test the fundamental fairness of a state's evidentiary
rules by the same test of cross-examination now imposed by the confrontation clause. Such constitutionalization is what Justice Harlan
sought to avoid.
E. THE MCCORMICK EXCEPTION APPROACH
This approach calls for recognition that the confrontation clause does
indeed constitutionalize the Hearsay Rule. However, in order to avoid
stifling state reform efforts, it also calls for constitutionalization of the
whole hearsay concept with all the exceptions that are now recognized
and which may be recognized in the future. In his theory constitutionalizing the Hearsay Rule, Wigmore called for recognition that any constitutionalization should carry the exceptions to the rule along with it
because the framers of the Constitution did not exclude hearsay exceptions (such as the dying declaration exception) already existing or
being formed. 179
To the basic Wigmore thesis of constitutionalization of the rule
and its present and future exceptions can be appended Professor McCormick's suggestion of the creation of a broad new exception under
which all hearsay, if found to be (1) necessary and (2) probative, is
admissible:
179. Moreover, this right of cross-examination thus secured was not a right de.
void of exceptions. The right to subject opposing testimony to cross-examination
is the right to have the Hearsay rule enforced; for the Hearsay rule is the rule

requiring cross-examination.... Now the Hearsay rule is not a rule without ex-

ceptions; there never was a time when it was without exceptions. There were a
number of well-established ones at the time of the earliest constitutions, and others
might be expected to be developed in the future. The rule had always involved
the idea of exceptions, and the constitution-makers indorsed the general principle

merely as such .... The rule sanctioned by the Constitution is the Hearsay rule
as to cross-examination, with all the exceptions that may legitimately be found,
developed, or created therein.
5 WIGMORE supra note 8, § 1897 at 180-31.
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If the present hearsay system of exclusion subject to exceptions continues in jury trials, a new exception, wider still than the
Model Code Rule or the Uniform Rule, will need to be formulated
so that the judge may use the greatest resource we have for justice
in these matters of evidence-his responsible judgment. I suggest
this: a hearsay statement will be received if the judge finds that the
need for and the probative value of the statement render it a fair
means of proof under the circumstances.80

It can be argued that the Wigmore thesis with the broad McCormick exception appended thereto would, in theory, satisfy the
constitutional purists who equate confrontation with cross-examination
(although the practical result may be offensive) is consistent with
precedent, and would not frustrate the federalists in their desire to
encourage state reform in evidence. However, such a constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule with the McCormick exception would be to
fashion an exception that could conceivably swallow the rule.' 8 1 This

approach, while more circumspect in constitutional theory, would
achieve the same results as the straightforward federalist approach set
forth above. Certainly the incorporation into the confrontation clause
of an agent, such as the McCormick suggestion, that could erode the
basic rule would not be a happy prospect for constitutional purists.
F.

TiH

TRADITIONALIST APPROACH

This is the approach typified by the position taken in the Green
majority opinion of Mr. Justice White and also, by reading it narrowly,
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall in Evans. 8 2 The dis180.

MCCoRMIcx, supra note 8, § 305, at 634 (emphasis added).

181. The right to confrontation and the rule against hearsay are both designed
to ensure the reliability of evidence upon which a verdict is returned . , t[iJn
apparent conflict with the right to confrontation, numerous exceptions
the
hearsay rule were created which permitted an unexamined witness to testify
against the defendant. Underlying this development was an awareness that some
hearsay declarations are no less reliable than cross-examined testimony. Confrontation, however, is more than a direct guarantee of reliability; it incorporates an
element of fairness, of affording the defendant an opportunity to test evidence
against him, no matter how reliable that evidence may seem. For this reason, an
expansion of the right to confrontation is inconsistent with a simultaneous expansion of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. While hearsay may not violate
the rule's simple reliability guarantee, it does violate the fairness element of
confrontation. In a criminal system whose reliability guarantees are imperfect,
this fairness notion is necessary to ensure that any mistakes tend to favor the defendant. While courts have either avoided the issue or equated an exception to
the hearsay rule with an exception to the right of confrontation, it is submitted
that the orthodox principles supporting the admission of certain types of hearsay
evidence do not satisfy the policies underlying the right of confrontation.
Note, supra note 20, at 939-41.
182. It should be noted that three of the four dissenters in Dutton v. Evans, Justices
Black, Douglas and the opinion writer, Justice Marshall, all joined the Court's majority
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tinctive feature of this approach is the traditional concept of judicial
restraint. The approach calls for recognition of the fact that there is a
core value in the confrontation clause that must be preserved.1 3 and
that all evidentiary hearsay exceptions must be measured against that
core value. Under such a test, some hearsay exceptions may be incompatible with the confrontation clause and, on the other hand, some
hearsay evidence, while it may not fit into an existing exception, might
nevertheless not violate the confrontation clause if admitted. s4 However, in enforcing the confrontation clause, the traditionalist would
believe the Court should proceed cautiously in the traditional commonlaw method of reviewing each hearsay exception through the facts of
the case and determining whether that exception, under those facts,
does or does not violate that individual defendant's right. The Court
was invited to "map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that
would determine the validity of all such hearsay exceptions" 1 5 but
declined to do so. It conceded that confrontation and hearsay were
designed to protect the same values, but held that the overlap is not
complete and that there are still two distinct rules. The Green majority
limited itself to the case before the Court to decide if the California
exception before it did or did not violate the core value of the confrontation clause. Such an approach, marked as it is by judicial restraint, is
not as interesting as the other approaches discussed above. It is not as
innovative as the theories of confrontation advocated in the availability,
cross-examining procedure--due process, or McCormick exception approaches. It is not as decisive as the purist approach; and, it does not
appease the state's interests as greatly as the federalists advocate. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the only approach that can command majority
support on the Court. It does preserve meaning for a constitutional
mandate and it does not unduly fetter state experimentation in the area
of hearsay reform. It should be recognized that in the clash between
federalists and purists there is a conflict of motives. The federalists,
here typified by hearsay rule reformers, point out that the trial process
is ultimately a search for truth and that exclusionary rules, such as the
Hearsay Rule, frequently deprive the trier of fact of relevant evidence
opinion in California v. Green; for them the approaches in the Green majority opinion
and the Evans dissent must have been somewhat similar.
183. ". . . it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial that
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." 399 U.S. at 157.
184. 399 U.S. at 156. For a review of the major hearsay exceptions and a discussion
of how each one should be viewed under the confrontation clause, see Note, supra note
19, at 749-68.
185. 399 U.S. at 162 [concurring opinions].
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that is needed if truth is to be found. Therefore, any rule such as the
confrontation clause which threatens to make it more difficult to reform
exclusionary rules is viewed with alarm. On the other hand, the constitutional purists are motivated by a concern for fair treatment for
those subjected to the criminal process. They view the confrontation
clause as guaranteeing the fundamentally important right of crossexamination; and they view with equal alarm any reformer who would,
by changing the Hearsay Rule, weaken that basic right of cross-examination. Perhaps, therefore, the traditional approach of judicial restraint, with its recognition of a core constitutional value to be preserved, but with its reluctance to make sweeping declarations as to the
meaning of that right in the absence of concrete fact situations, is the
best possible compromise between the two different approaches advocated by the federalists and the constitutional purists.
A SUMMARY AND A SUGGESTION
After analyzing the six possible solutions to the present confrontationhearsay dilemma, it is clear that each has advantages and disadvantages.
None is without defect. On balance, the traditionalist approach is the
most acceptable alternative available. It comports with the tradition of
judicial restraint, rejecting sweeping definitional solutions in preference to the hard road of case by case adjudication. It preserves a meaning for the confrontation clause and is unwilling to balance away a
fundamental right in deference to any state sponsored reform notion
that might come along. Nevertheless, the slow process of adjudication
based on the concept that hearsay and confrontation are different does
not pose the spectre of a rampaging confrontation clause so feared by
the federalists on the Court. Furthermore, because of the traditional
pattern of its approach---examining each hearsay exception only when
that exception arises in a concrete factual setting in an actual criminal
case-it has the best chance of acceptance by both purists and federalists on the Court because it brings them back to a common starting
point and relieves the fears caused by either the federalist or constitutional purist approaches to confrontation.
This writer would, nevertheless, suggest that a further refinement

of the traditionalist approach typified by the majority opinion in Green
is possible. The core value of confrontation that is to be preserved by
the case by case testing of hearsay exceptions seems somewhat limited
in Green and does not fully recognize and rank-order the various corn-
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ponent parts of the confrontation clause. Furthermore, it is possible to
preserve some of the advantages of the other approaches by taking a
more composite view of the confrontation clause. It does seem that
the weight of precedent and logic support the view that the most indispensable right protected by the confrontation clause is cross-examination. The Green idea that the core value is only the literal right to
confront face-to-face is not a complete reading of the clause. There are
other distinct components of the right to confrontation-the idea of
availability, demeanor, presence of the accused at his own trial, and
oath-that should be evaluated by the Court in each case.
After determining that cross-examination is the core component
to be preserved-because it is essential to our adversary system-this
writer would then list availability as a separate component and next in
importance. The availability component is actually the touchstone that
the Court should use to determine that cross-examination was not
afforded the accused. Did the state do all it could? Could the prosecutor
have produced the witness? Can the unavailability of the witness, under
the facts, be excused because the inconvenience caused by producing
him (as in business-records-exception cases), outweighs any possible
benefit his presence could afford the accused? Is the witness a minor
witness called to supply a technical, basically uncontested detail as
opposed to a key prosecution witness? The availability concept, as
articulated by Justice Harlan in Green, should not be lost simply
because it does not provide the definitive test of confrontation that
avoids hearsay constitutionalization problems as Justice Harlan hoped
it would. Instead, it should be treated as a separate component of the
clause giving it new meaning not present in the Hearsay Rule. The
availability component of the confrontation clause is really utilizing
the clause to maintain a minimal level of prosecutorial behavior in the
production of evidence and confirms the Green idea that while confrontation and hearsay protect similar values, they are not congruent.
In the operation of the Hearsay Rule, if a statement falls into certain
exceptions it is admissible regardless of availability. Under the confrontation clause, if a key witness can be produced he should be produced even if his out-of-court statements do fall into some recognized
hearsay exception.
While all agree that the demeanor, and particularly, the oath elements of the confrontation right are perhaps, as Wigmore says, not
essential to the rule, these elements should not be forgotten. It is
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entirely possible that in certain fact situations demeanor evidence can
be critical despite the availability of cross-examination at an earlier
186
hearing.
The last element of confrontation, and the final proof that it is
different from the Hearsay Rule and not a restatement of hearsay concepts, is the presence of the accused at his own trial. This right has
nothing to do with the Hearsay Rule or with its exceptions. Nevertheless, Illinois v. Allen 8 7 makes it clear that presence is an essential
component of the confrontation clause that can only be waived under
certain conditions.18 8
This composite approach is not as easy to apply as a restrictive
definition such as the cross-examining procedure approach. Furthermore, its application in individual fact situations and its unfolding in
case by case litigation offers no immediate solution to the pragmatistpurist dilemma the Court created in Evans. Nevertheless, it is a more
realistic approach. It does preserve a constitutional meaning for the
confrontation clause, and its slow operation as a separate rule does not
threaten to constitutionalize the Hearsay Rule. It is the solution to the
constitutional dilemma the Court now faces that should have the best
chance of adoption.
186. The dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan in Green and the California Supreme Court's
opinion in that case on the importance of contemporaneous cross-examination to preserve
demeanor evidence cannot be dismissed lightly. The value of the demeanor component
to the right of confrontation should not be lost but should be reviewed each time a fact
situation arising under a hearsay exception is challenged under the confrontation clause.
See Note, supra note 20, at 950-51 suggesting that if defects in preliminary hearings are common, there perhaps should be a presumption against the adequacy of cross-examination
at such hearings.
187. 597 U.S. 337 (1970). In response to the Allen decision, the American Bar Association has just released a tentative draft entitled Tnm Juror's ROLE IN DauaNo Wrr
TRIAL DxSarUMoNs, ABA PaojEcr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JusTca (1971).
188. Research indicates that as a matter of separate focus, Illinois v. Allen is the
only time the Court has distinguished precisely the presence aspect of the right to confrontation. Justice Black held that this aspect of confrontation must not "so handicap a
trial judge" as to prevent the judge from protecting orderly and dignified proceedings
in the courtroom.

